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RECONSIDERING THE EVOLUTIONARY EROSION ACCOUNT OF CORPORATE 
FIDUCIARY LAW  
William W. Bratton† 
This Article reconsiders the dominant account of corporate law’s duty of loyalty, which asserts 
that the courts have steadily relaxed standards of fiduciary scrutiny applied to self-dealing by 
corporate managers across more than a century of history—to the great detriment of the 
shareholder interest.  The account originated in Harold Marsh, Jr.’s foundational article, Are 
Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, published in The Business 
Lawyer in 1966.  Marsh’s showing of historical lassitude has been successfully challenged in a 
recent book by Professor David Kershaw.  This Article takes Professor Kershaw’s critique a step 
further, asking whether the evolutionary erosion account continues to exert normative power in 
today’s corporate governance context.  The answer is that it does not, a result that obtains even 
though erosion of the standards that courts apply to management self-dealing has continued 
unabated ever since Marsh published in 1966, and even though there is no reason to think that 
management self-dealing benefits the shareholder interest.  The result follows from the operation 
of the corporate governance system, which has assimilated and redeployed the erosion account’s 
motivating insight that officer and director self-dealing transactions do not make cost-benefit 
sense from the shareholder point of view.  Regulation backs up the norm of aversion.  Disclosure 
rules make self-dealing transparent to shareholders, who have no reason to like self-dealing and 
who now stand ready and able to register their preferences regarding such matters in corporate 
boardrooms.  At the same time, the requirement of a majority independent board makes self-
dealing transactions by board members highly inconvenient, because self-dealing undercuts 
independence.  The practice reflects all of this, as shown by reference to hand-collected datasets 
of self-dealing transactions at publicly-traded companies and of litigation in respect of self-
dealing transactions in the Delaware Chancery Court.  The classic self-dealing transaction, 
 
† Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; de la 
Cruz/Mentschikoff Endowed Chair in Law and Economics and Senior Lecturer, University of Miami School of Law; 
Research Associate, European Corporate Governance Institute.  My thanks to Larry Hamermesh, Robert Thompson, 
Andrew Tuch, and John Mark Zeberkiewicz for their comments on earlier drafts. 
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although still a focal point of academic discourse on corporate fiduciary law, does not matter all 
that much in real world companies with dispersed shareholders.  It is no longer an unsolved 
problem stemming from separated ownership and control.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 This Article reconsiders the dominant account of corporate law’s duty of loyalty, referred 
to here as the “evolutionary erosion account.”1  The account asserts that the courts have steadily 
relaxed standards of fiduciary scrutiny applied to self-dealing by corporate managers across more 
than a century of history, to the great detriment of the shareholder interest.  The account originated 
in Professor Harold Marsh, Jr.’s foundational article, Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest 
and Corporate Morality, published in 1966. 2   Marsh’s showing of historical lassitude 
complemented the then-prevailing account of a corporate governance system impaired by 
separated ownership and control and a legal system enervated by charter competition.  The 
evolutionary erosion story made perfect sense in that context—just as the legislatures competing 
for corporate charters relaxed statutory constraints on managers during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, so did the judiciary follow suit, catering to managers by allowing them 
to self-deal.  Shabby compromises followed for corporate fiduciary law.  The erosion account had 
a clear and powerful normative implication: standards of conduct and review needed to be 
retightened to break the pattern of management advantage-taking.   
 Marsh’s presentation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century cases has been 
forcefully challenged in a recent book by Professor David Kershaw.3  Building on previous work, 
Kershaw shows that, even as relaxation did indeed occur, Marsh much overstates its salience.  
More important, Kershaw rejects the notion of an inappropriate accommodation of an 
unaccountable management class, instead explaining the relaxation as sensible adjustment in the 
 
1 The word “erosion” is chosen in recognition of the following sentence in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928): “Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular exceptions. . . .” 
2 Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966).  
Marsh’s article is a rare exemplar of corporate law scholarship with a long shelf life. So far in this century, scholars 
have cited it 71 times.  The figure comes from a Westlaw LRJ search conducted on August 2, 2019. 
3 DAVID KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW (2018). 
4 
 
ordinary course of the caselaw’s evolution—the result of judicial modification of principles from 
trust and agency law in their reapplication to corporate fact patterns.   
 This Article takes the occasion of Kershaw’s critique to put the evolutionary erosion 
account to further questioning, asking whether it continues to exert normative power in today’s 
corporate governance context.  The answer is that it does not, for it is no longer relevant as a policy 
proposition.  This result obtains even though erosion of the standards that courts apply to 
management self-dealing has continued unabated since Marsh published in 1966 and even though 
there is no reason to think that management self-dealing benefits the shareholder interest.  The 
result follows from the operation of the corporate governance system, which has assimilated and 
redeployed the erosion account’s motivating insight that officer and director self-dealing 
transactions do not make cost-benefit sense from the shareholder point of view.  Today, the 
governance system itself discourages self-dealing transactions, and the judiciary no longer stands 
at the defensive front line.  The normative implications of evolutionary erosion change 
accordingly.   
 To make the case for these propositions, the Article takes a new look at the role played by 
management self-dealing transactions in public corporations.  The governance system, bolstered 
by federal disclosure rules, makes self-dealing transparent to shareholders, who have no reason to 
like it and now stand ready and able to register their preferences regarding such matters in 
corporate boardrooms.  At the same time, the requirement of a majority independent board 
(imposed by the stock exchanges) makes self-dealing transactions by board members highly 
inconvenient, because self-dealing undercuts independence.  The practice reflects the regulation, 
as shown by reference to hand-collected datasets of self-dealing transactions at publicly-traded 
companies and of litigation in respect of self-dealing transactions in the Delaware Chancery Court.  
The classic self-dealing transaction, though still a focal point of academic discourse on corporate 
fiduciary law, does not matter all that much in real world companies with dispersed shareholders.  
It is no longer an unsolved problem stemming from separated ownership and control.   
 This Article has five parts.  Part I begins with Marsh’s thesis and goes on to trace its 
diffusion into the literature as the generally-accepted account.  Marsh identified three phases of 
corporate law history: first, a late 19th century phase in which all self-dealing transactions were 
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voidable at the company’s option; second, an early 20th century phase in which self-dealing 
transactions were valid (and not voidable at the company’s option) if approved by a majority of 
disinterested directors and judicially sustained as fair; and third, a mid-20th century phase in which 
any self-dealing transaction, whatever its approval process, could be judicially sustained as fair.  
Marsh’s historical story invited critical inspection of present boardroom practice.  Subsequent 
literature accepted the invitation, describing corporate boardrooms as inappropriate venues for 
decision-making respecting self-dealing transactions and diagnosing a problem of structural bias 
in favor of insider interests.  Norms of collegiality and limitations on available information 
disabled outside directors from applying the appropriate standard of arm’s-length contract.  
Meanwhile, dispersed shareholders could not self-protect, because the shareholder ratification 
process provided an intrinsically ineffective backstop due to informational constraints and 
collective action barriers.  Two points followed.  First, the best legal approach to self-dealing 
transactions is outright prohibition, which just happened to be the erosion account’s lost historical 
starting point.  Second, absent outright prohibition, substantive or procedural barriers to judicial 
review of transactional fairness were a bad thing.  Both points resonated deeply in the context of 
the corporate governance system that prevailed when Marsh published and for many years 
thereafter.  
 Part II extends Marsh’s historical story, showing how corporate fiduciary law continued to 
erode after he wrote.  Today’s plaintiffs face higher hurdles, and not just those from civil 
procedure, because today, judicial fairness scrutiny can be averted by a correct boardroom process.  
At the same time, the zone of contractual opting-out has expanded.  Part II’s presentation focuses 
specially on the duty of loyalty in Delaware law, where the final concession of disinterested 
director validation of self-dealing transactions is thought to have occurred relatively recently.4  In 
fact, it has been 35 years since Delaware’s scales tipped decisively toward boardroom validation.5 
 Part III takes up Kershaw’s retelling of Marsh’s historical story.  Kershaw brings a fresh 
perspective, making comparative reference to the law of the United Kingdom (U.K.), from which 
nineteenth century courts in the United States (U.S.) derived the flat rule prohibiting self-dealing 
 
4 The case is Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 
2006). 
5 The case is Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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transactions.  Kershaw shows that fundamental doctrinal differences made the U.K.’s prohibition 
dysfunctional in U.S. contexts.  He also depicts the U.S. experience of doctrinal relaxation as a 
part of a neutral process of adjustment—the courts were gradually figuring out how to extend the 
basic outlines of trust and agency law to corporations.  Relaxation therefore need not be explained 
as an expedient accommodation of a favored management interest.  Significantly, Kershaw does 
not erase erosion from corporate fiduciary law’s historical outline.  But his account does negate 
the notion that categorical prohibition of self-dealing is the law’s natural base point. This 
conclusion is seconded by reference to Adolf Berle’s writing on the duty of loyalty, which looks 
at the same caselaw to draw very different conclusions from those of Marsh.6   
 Part IV turns to corporate governance today to reconsider the erosion account’s normative 
conclusion--that corporate fiduciary law has evolved in a fundamentally unsatisfactory direction.  
Today’s question is whether, in the present governance environment, in which shareholder 
preferences matter greatly (whether as regards the business plan or adherence to best practices), 
there remains sufficient slack to allow management to increase its returns systematically by 
entering into self-dealing transactions with the firm.  The answer is no, at least so far as concerns 
companies where ownership and control are separated.  Management, held to a lockstep salary 
system in Marsh’s day, now gets its returns upfront in the form of liberal equity compensation.  
And, although it has been questioned whether these returns are excessive and whether management 
brings power to bear in garnering excessive gains, there also is evidence that arm’s-length 
 
6 Andrew F. Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (2019), 
covers much of the same territory as does this Article, including the reconsideration of Marsh and reception of 
Kershaw’s points, but to very different effect.  Professor Tuch’s primary points are comparative, and his perspective 
is doctrinal as well as historical.  He shows that U.S. fiduciary law and U.K. fiduciary have evolved so as to operate 
similarly even as they have very different doctrinal start points.  As to this point, there is no quarrel here.  This 
Article limits its observations to the U.S. system, and its primary points are normative and theoretical—its seeks to 
integrate an account of academic thinking about corporate fiduciary law with both an account of the evolution of the 
corporate governance system and an account of the evolution of the law itself.  Most of this is orthogonal to 
Professor Tuch’s account.  This Article shares with Professor Tuch’s confidence in shareholder decision-making, 
even as this Article’s account of the evolution of Delaware law across the last five decades contrasts sharply with 
Tuch’s.   
 Mention should be made of a third paper traversing this subject matter, Amir N. Licht, Farewell to 
Fairness: Towards Retiring Delaware’s Entire Fairness Review (European Corporate Governance Institute - Law 
Working Paper No. 439/2019),  https://ssrn.com/abstract =3331097, which predicts that the Delaware Court’s 
increasing emphasis on shareholder ratification portends the disappearance of entire fairness review, bringing U.S. 
fiduciary law into line with that of other common law jurisdictions.  Licht’s doctrinal approach parallels Professor 
Tuch’s but contrasts sharply with the normative view expressed here, which sees entire fairness scrutiny playing a 
positive role in corporate governance even as it takes its partial retreat with equanimity. 
 
7 
 
bargaining determines these outcomes.  More important, returns to management (whether or not 
excessive), are universally seen to be generous, leaving managers no elbow room to make a real-
world case for supplemental returns through side deals.  Generalizing, a norm against classic self-
dealing transactions has taken hold in the boardroom.  Systemic requirements assure that the norm 
is enforced.  Mandatory disclosure reduces the space for backroom coverups.  Mandates and norms 
imposing majority and super-majority independent boards create an additional and potent stick—
any outside director who procures an extra dollop of corporate gravy on the side loses his or her 
independence with a concomitant loss of governance utility.  Finally, systemic improvements now 
render boardroom structural bias less of a problem.   
 These observations are backed up by reference to two hand-collected data sets.  The first 
takes the 31 companies in the Dow Jones average and adds 31 companies from the S&P midcap 
400 and 31 companies from the S&P smallcap 600 and reviews the policies and transactions 
reported in their most recent proxy statements.  Although plenty of self-dealing transactions are 
reported—the searching nature of the disclosure rules assures that result—almost none figure 
materially in the context of the corporations’ financial reports.  A small number of big-ticket 
transactions shows up at controlled companies, but there are business-based explanations even 
here with those.  The second dataset reviews every duty of loyalty case in Westlaw’s Delaware 
Chancery Court database to test the salience of litigation concerning self-dealing transactions.  
Only a handful of reported cases concerning self-dealing transactions in publicly traded companies 
have appeared since the mid-1980s.  Today’s public company fiduciary litigation is mostly about 
mergers and acquisitions, a subject matter as to which Marsh’s sought-for regime of prohibition 
makes no sense whatsoever.      
 Significantly,  the small number of red-flag transactions go up in a subset of companies 
subject to blockholder control, a group making up 10% of the public company dataset.7  This 
suggests a line-drawing exercise, with controlled companies excluded from this Article’s 
suggestion that the governance system now effectively checks self-dealing transactions.  This 
 
7 The categorization derives from a qualitative review of each company.  The operative standard combines 
blockholding with an implication of control.  Ten companies in the sample fit the specification.  In eight of the ten, 
the holder owns more than 20% and either is or has been a top executive.  In the remaining two cases, the blocks are 
less than 20% but the holder is a CEO who has exercised control for an extended period.  Passive institutions like 
BlackRock and Vanguard, which own blocks of 5% or more in almost all of the companies, are not included. 
8 
 
suggestion is confirmed by reference to an additional dataset of the registration statements of 50 
companies that conducted initial public offerings in the fall of 2019.  In this group, blockholder 
control is the dominant governance mode and self-dealing transactions have greater economic 
salience.   Even here, however, there is evidence of the operation of systemic constraints.  
Part V reconsiders the meaning of evolutionary erosion by reference to recent 
developments in Delaware fiduciary law.  The Article here takes a look at the erosion account’s 
flip side, pointing to areas for which the envelope of fiduciary scrutiny has expanded and 
contending that Delaware, even as it has opened a door to boardroom validation of self-dealing 
contracts, has not dredged a safe harbor.   Fairness scrutiny is blocked only when independent 
directors are in charge, and both director independence and blockholder control are established or 
negated under capacious, fact-sensitive standards.  Meanwhile, Delaware’s twice-testing rubric, 
the initial appearance of which dates back to 1971,8 now forcefully moves Delaware fiduciary law 
in the direction posited by Adolf Berle eighty years ago.9   
I. EVOLUTIONARY EROSION, STRUCTURAL BIAS, AND THE ELUSIVE ARM’S 
LENGTH BARGAIN 
 A researcher looking for favorable academic commentary on the law of corporate self-
dealing transactions—that is, for articles concluding that all is well and that the law creates a robust 
protective shield against injurious insider advantage-taking—will come up close to empty-
handed.10  The tradition is otherwise.  The literature holds that the duty of loyalty has had an 
unhealthy evolution, starting out but then abandoning robust prohibition.  It depicts a downward 
slide that proceeded in four stages to leave us with two unsatisfactory alternatives respecting self-
dealing transactions.  Under the first, an insider’s deal with the company can be validated 
 
8 The case is Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
9 See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). 
10 Only one such doctrinal paper appeared in the course of research for this article, David S. Ruder, Duty of Loyalty - 
A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 BUS. LAW. 1383 (1985) (reviewing the field in anticipation of an ALI project 
by reference to cases selected for inclusion in casebooks).  Approving comments tend to show up in work reflecting 
a contractarian theoretical perspective.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental 
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U.CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1988)(looking at the inflexibility of trust 
law and commenting that corporate law’s weaker constraints make sense in view of “a developed set of monitoring 
mechanisms”). 
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internally, whether by disinterested director approval or shareholder ratification, assuring a skew 
favoring the interests of the insider and disfavoring the investor interest.  Under the second, the 
deal can be validated as fair by a judge.  This, though superior to internal approval, turns out, upon 
careful inspection, to be a questionable palliative. 
 The Part lays out the components of this conventional wisdom, reviewing Marsh’s 
historical account in Section A, its restatement and extension by Dean Robert Clark in Section B, 
and the account’s implications in Section C. 
A. Erosion in History—the Marsh Thesis 
 Harold Marsh described a three-phase declension of corporate fiduciary law.  In the first 
phase, which began in 1880, the universal rule was that director and officer self-dealing 
transactions were voidable at the option of the corporation.11  Phase two had begun by 1910.  It 
was a more relaxed regime, in which a self-dealing transaction was valid if approved by a 
disinterested board majority and found fair by a reviewing court.12  A transaction approved by an 
interested board majority, however, remained subject to avoidance at the option of the corporation.  
The distinction between majority-interested and majority-disinterested approval reflected the 
redeployment of a principle of trust law in the corporate context.  Trust law provides that a trustee 
cannot transact with herself as regards trust property but can transact with the trust beneficiary, 
subject to fairness scrutiny.  The courts, adapting these principles to corporate law, reasoned that 
approval by a majority-interested board was the equivalent of a trustee transacting with herself; in 
contrast, if a majority-disinterested board approved the transaction, it was as if the trustee were 
contracting with the beneficiary.13  Marsh rejected this approach on policy grounds.  Although the 
approach technically held out a possibility of per se avoidance (given approval by interested 
directors), it was a possibility that in Marsh’s view would never be realized in the real world 
because disinterested board approval had become easy to get.  Any process protection bound up 
in the requirement of a disinterested board majority had become nugatory when the courts 
conceded that interested directors could be counted for quorum purposes when a board convened 
to approve a self-dealing transaction.  Thus, the transaction could be validated by the affirmative 
 
11 See Marsh supra note 2, at 36-39. 
12 Id. at 39-40.   
13 KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 346-49. 
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vote of a minority of disinterested directors.14  In addition, said Marsh, per se invalidity was no 
longer a possibility as regarded interlocked deals—transactions between companies with directors 
in common.15  
 Phase three of the history described the world that Marsh saw as he wrote in the mid-1960s. 
Per se invalidity, he said, was completely off the table and any self-dealing transaction could be 
judicially sustained as fair, however infirm the internal corporate process of approval.16  But he 
also admitted that this description was not quite accurate doctrinally, for per se invalidity absent 
disinterested majority approval remained the common law of many states.  Marsh argued that per 
se invalidity was a dead letter even so, due to the proliferation of exculpatory charter provisions 
and statutory safe harbors.17     
 Why had the doctrine evolved in this way?  Marsh offered no explanation, even as he made 
clear his disapproval.  For him, the reasoning in the early cases, which made the transactions 
voidable at the company’s option, remained persuasive.  According to those cases, influences 
within the boardroom made disinterested director approval intrinsically suspicious, 18  and 
approving directors could not be trusted to do an arm’s-length check on one of their colleagues.19  
It was, said the courts, just a matter of human nature.20  For Marsh, nothing in later opinions 
improved on or refuted that wisdom.  
 Marsh recommended a return to phase one’s regime of prohibition, but with a federal 
administrative twist.  State corporate law should be preempted, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) inserted in place of the state courts.  Self-dealing transactions by SEC 
 
14 See Marsh, supra note 2, at 41-42.  To see the problem, assume a seven-seat board with five interested directors 
and two disinterested directors.  All attend the meeting, with the interested directors being necessary to establish a 
quorum.  The interested five abstain from the vote on the transaction, which is approved by the two disinterested 
directors, who constitute a majority of those voting.   
15 Id. at 42. 
16 Id. at 43. 
17 Id. at 45-50.  The Delaware Supreme Court approved such a provision in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 
A.2d 107, 117-119 (Del. 1952). 
18 Marsh, supra note 2, at 37, citing Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. Ry. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, at 74, 8 N. E. 355, at 
358 (1886). 
19 See Marsh, supra note 2, at 37, citing Cumberland Coal and Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, at 606 (1875). 
20 Id. at 38, citing Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 88 Ala. 630, at 642-43, 7 So. 108, at 112 
(1889). 
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registered companies would be prohibited, subject to the possibility of SEC exemption on a 
showing of fairness and consistency with investor protection.21  
B. Clark’s Extension 
Dean Robert Clark’s foundational corporate law treatise expanded on Marsh.  It reached 
the same normative bottom line, strengthening it with a powerful cost-benefit showing.  Clark also 
filled in the explanatory gap, in effect completing Marsh’s historical presentation.   
 Clark’s cost-benefit analysis upped Marsh’s normative ante.  Unfair self-dealing contracts 
inflict two modes of injury, said Clark: (1) they entail collection of unwarranted monopoly rents 
by their insider beneficiaries; and (2) they introduce unproductive uncertainty into securities 
valuation, in turn implying an increase in corporations’ cost of capital.22  For Clark, as for Marsh, 
existing correctives, whether emanating from corporate governance institutions or from market 
discipline, insufficiently protected shareholders from the possibility of injury:  the system left open 
a zone of discretion within which management could self-serve.  Meanwhile, Clark saw no 
cognizable benefits emanating from the “fair” subset of self-dealing transactions.23  Any savings 
of transactions costs yielded by an inside deal would be small and hard to measure.  For most 
goods and services, third-party provision could satisfy corporate needs.  Situations for which the 
insider had the benefit of some special savings of production costs would be rare.  Thus, except in 
the rare case, the costs outweighed the benefits.  This conclusion yielded a revised version of 
Marsh’s law reform proposal: as with Marsh, state law should be preempted and determinations 
on self-dealing transactions should be remitted to the SEC; but a manager seeking an SEC variance 
would face a tougher standard—the self-dealing transaction would have to be “better than fair.”24   
Turning to Marsh’s history, Clark posed four possible reasons for the pattern of relaxation.  
First, the courts might have abandoned the original per se rule pursuant to a more general common 
law shift from rules to standards.  Second, the fact patterns had changed.  Where courts in the era 
of prohibition had dealt with the egregious doings of the robber barons who controlled mid-19th 
century railroads, later courts decided close corporation cases in which consent processes had more 
 
21 Id. at 74-75. 
22 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 4.2, at 157 (1986). 
23 Id. §5.4 at 180. 
24 Id. §§ 5.4.2-5.4.3, at 185-188. 
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credibility. Third, accumulating experience could have cast self-dealing transactions in a more 
favorable light, with courts coming to appreciate that in some cases they made all parties better 
off.  Fourth and finally, courts and legislatures had been captured by management.25  
 Clark kept his cost-benefit analysis and his historical gloss in separate silos.  But the 
exercise of comparing the contents of the two yields irresistible synergistic gains.  Let us 
accordingly deploy the cost-benefit exercise, which retains its power, in an evaluation of the 
competing historical hypotheses.  
 The first and second historical explanations (rules to standards and different case fact 
patterns) are neutral and doctrinal.  Under these explanations, judicial approaches to corporate self-
dealing transactions changed for the same reason that judicial approaches to many other problems 
changed in the early 20th century:  the courts were responding to the merits of the cases before 
them and, in any event, were minded to take a more flexible, fact-sensitive approach to their 
common law decision-making.  A tension arises when we consider these neutral doctrinal 
explanations in light of Clark’s cost/benefit conclusion: although relaxation of fiduciary standards 
may have followed from the judicial conduct of business as usual, this was a case where the 
ordinary course conduct of business had a negative cost result.  But, because the negative result 
presumably was unintended, corrective law reform could proceed as a similar business-as-usual 
proposition, for the first two explanations implicate no cost-benefit arguments favoring the 
management interest.    
 Clark’s third explanation—that the benefits might outweigh the costs—followed from a 
contradictory cost-benefit appraisal.  Let us assume that Clark has much the better of the cost-
benefit case.  A question arises: How could early 20th century courts have perceived benefits when 
any sensible review of the matter reveals an overwhelming raft of deadweight costs?  If the answer 
to the question is that, in fact, there were no new benefits for inclusion in the early 20th century 
balance, then this third, cost-benefit explanation for evolutionary erosion is lacking in policy 
content.  It reemerges as a  makeweight, expedient justification for doctrinal change, a mantra 
mooted without anyone having really believed it.  It follows that the third “explanation” is not 
 
25 Id. § 5.1, at 162-63 (1986).  Clark, worried about problems of proof, expressed skepticism about all but the second 
explanation.   
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really an explanation at all, at least when taken at face value.  Reconsidered in context, it collapses 
into Clark’s fourth explanation, management capture.   
 The capture explanation provides an answer to the question as to how the courts could have 
perceived non-existent benefits.  Simply, they were insensitive to the cost side of the tradeoff 
because they catered to management.  This explanatory alternative negates and subsumes the third 
explanation.  It also synchronizes nicely with the first explanation: the shift from rules to standards 
facilitated doctrinal change motivated by a commitment to the management interest. 
 Unsurprisingly, the management capture explanation has considerable purchase in the 
literature.  It facilitates the integration of the negative view of charter competition with learning 
on fiduciary law.  It teaches us that the same forces that caused the corporate law race to the 
bottom26 deleteriously influenced the legal treatment of self-dealing transactions.  Significantly, 
market controls do not drop out of this picture.  They remain in place as constraints on the self-
serving misconduct of managers with a question arising regarding the constraint’s intensity.  Clark, 
like most of his contemporaries, concluded that the controls operated inadequately, proving 
insufficient to prevent injury to investors.   
 We emerge with a description in which governance institutions and markets operate 
together to build in considerable slack, leaving management a zone of discretion within which to 
line its own pockets.  State fiduciary law figures importantly in the picture of causation: the choice 
of chartering jurisdiction lies with management, therefore states competing for charters will have 
an incentive to provide rules that accord management an envelope within which to redistribute 
wealth from the firm (and hence the shareholders) to themselves.27  
C. Implications: Structural Bias, Market Failure, Judicial Failure 
Let us now reconsider the justifications for a rule of prohibition, as set out in the 19th 
century cases, in light of Marsh’s historical case, as expanded on by Clark.  One emerges with the 
essential components of the policy position regarding self-dealing transactions that continues to 
prevail in academic thinking.  Under this, neither internal corporate decision-making processes nor 
 
26 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 670, 701 
(1974) (depicting Delaware as leading in the deterioration of corporate standards). 
27 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1442, 1462 (1992). 
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outside judicial review provide any guarantee against systematic shareholder injury due to self-
dealing.  Something stronger is needed.  
 The corporate law literature provides three sets of more particular observations concerning 
the processes pursuant to which management self-dealing transactions are reviewed and 
(potentially) approved.  One set concerns boardroom approval, the second set concerns shareholder 
ratification, and the third set concerns judicial review for fairness.  Each of the three modes of 
transactional approval turns out to be inadequate, because none of the three guarantees the 
shareholders the same result that could have been obtained through bargaining at arm’s length. 
1. The Boardroom. 
 Corporate boardrooms are viewed as inhospitable venues for decision-making in the best 
interests of the shareholders whenever managers propose self-dealing transactions.  Even a board 
with a disinterested director majority cannot be trusted, for all directors are “insiders” in a 
cognizable sense and, accordingly, are structurally biased in favor of accommodating other 
insiders.  This picture of “structural bias” follows in part from the features of the corporate 
governance system at the time that Marsh and Clark wrote28—it had not yet taken a turn toward 
thoroughgoing control by independent directors.29  In those days, CEOs retained control of the 
board nomination process, making even independent outsiders beholden to them for the favor of 
appointment and retention.  Many directors, although disinterested in a particular transaction, had 
other significant business relationships with the company.  Structural bias also has intrinsic causes 
that can be expected to persist—behavioral influences operating even given an independent board 
vested with control over nominations.  These are the factors that give rise to sympathy for the self-
dealer, such as common backgrounds and experiences, social ties, norms of collegiality, and in-
 
28 The leading contemporary account is MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 205-06 (1971) (asserting 
that few boards put difficult questions, meaningfully evaluated the top team, or considered dismissal of an 
unsuccessful CEO). 
29 Observers began to acknowledge the change around the turn of this century.  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward 
B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 871, 881-82 (2002); The Professor: Jay Lorsch, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fall 2001, at 18. 
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group dynamics.30  Meanwhile, craven CEOs and other powerful insiders are ever ready to exploit 
the system’s weakness and take whatever they can.31 
 Let us moot a managerialist comeback against this diagnosis. The comeback highlights the 
personal integrity of the sorts of people nominated to sit on corporate boards (even assuming CEO 
domination of the nomination process) along with the reputational constraints under which such 
people operate.  This, says the proponent, assures “integrity.”  The assurance in place, the 
proponent turns to “discretion” and “flexibility.” The corporate governance system works well as 
an economic machine precisely because the board is accorded a wide zone of discretion to manage 
the business.  Just as the business plan is left to the board, so should we leave to the board the cost-
benefit judgment on self-dealing transactions, at least so long as the deciding directors are 
disinterested.   
The literature makes a powerful response to this comeback.  The case for management 
invokes the business judgment rule and its justification, suggesting that all decisions should enjoy 
the rule’s protection, despite structural bias.  The problem with the argument is that it ignores 
corporate law, which only accords unconflicted decisions the degree of respect sufficient to close 
off ex post judicial review.32  Furthermore, the business judgment constraint against ex post review 
of board decisions itself follows from a cost-benefit judgment—that shareholder returns are 
enhanced when courts respect a zone of decision-making discretion.  When the decision concerns 
a self-dealing transaction, however, the law applies a radically different treatment to the fact 
 
30 See, e.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal 
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 91-108.  The appearance of 
special committee power to effect dismissal of shareholder derivative actions in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
triggered a spate of this commentary.  See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate 
Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 111-13 (1980); John C. Coffee, Jr. 
& Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal or Legislative Reform, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 261, 283 (1981); James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit 
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962; Marc I. Steinberg, The Use of 
Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 24 (1980); Daniel 
R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation 
Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 938 (1982).  Courts also expressed concern regarding structural bias.  See, e.g., Clark 
v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Watts v. 
Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1328 (D. Iowa 1981); Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 
n.5 (D. Conn. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). 
31 Victor Brudney Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty Obligations, 25 J. 
CORP. L. 209, 210, 216 (2000). 
32 Absent a showing of gross negligence or bad faith. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 
A.2d 27, 52-53 (Del. 2006). 
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pattern— judicial review, or, indeed, prohibition—precisely because the cost-benefit outcome has 
flipped.33 
2. Shareholders’ Meetings. 
Even if boards of directors cannot be trusted to decide about self-dealing transactions, there 
remains the alternative of shareholder ratification.  But, under the prevailing wisdom, the 
shareholders’ meeting makes for an even more ineffective venue than does the boardroom.   This 
wisdom first circulated in the days in which shareholders were seen as “rationally apathetic” 
regarding proposals presented in proxy statements.34  Given dispersed holdings and management 
control of the proxy machinery, it was thought that there was no incentive to invest in information 
gathering or politicking regarding even questionable proposals.35  Furthermore, under the then-
prevailing “Wall Street Rule,” the default voting choice was management support; if an investor 
took the view that the company was badly run, the best course was to sell.36   
These conditions have changed: today, most shareholders are institutions that make 
reasoned voting decisions (or pay consultants to make reasoned decisions for them).37  But there 
remains a strong argument that the shareholder venue is inappropriate in the context of self-dealing 
transactions.  Shareholder ratification occurs after the fact.  It cannot be deployed to replicate the 
context of an arm’s length bargain:  no amount of conventional disclosure puts voting shareholders 
in a position to make an effective business judgment regarding a given transaction, particularly a 
complex one.38 The shareholders are, accordingly, dependent on the board to assess the costs and 
benefits of a given self-dealing transaction—a board already deemed incapable of proceeding at 
arm’s length.  
3. Judicial Review for Fairness. 
A normative standard emerges in the above account:  a valid self-dealing transaction should 
replicate the result that would have been obtained in an arm’s length bargain.  Given this standard, 
even judicial fairness scrutiny emerges as ill-suited to protect shareholders.  To see this point, 
 
33 See Brudney, supra note 311, at 231. 
34 See CLARK, supra note 252, §9.5.1, at 390-92. 
35 Id. §9.5.2, at 392-93 (discussing freeriding). 
36 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. 
REV. 881, 903-06. 
37 See infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text. 
38 See Brudney, supra note 311, at 218-19. 
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assume that a self-dealing transaction has been entered into based on the approval of an interested 
board and that a derivative plaintiff puts the deal in front of a court for fairness review—this is the 
situation posited in the third phase of evolution described by Marsh.  The transaction, voidable per 
se under the law of the first and second phases now can be validated by the reviewing court.  
Assume that the court appraises the deal based on the price, making reference to comparable 
transactions.   Also assume that the goods or services subject to the contract are not homogenous 
(and thus not available in a substitute transaction at a price set in the market) but differentiated.  
The price is accordingly a function of bargaining between a particular buyer and a particular seller.  
A reviewing court can refer to comparable trades for parameters within which such a price 
negotiation might occur, but within those parameters cannot ascertain the price that should have 
followed for the corporation in an arm’s length transaction.  It instead sees a range of possible 
prices, all of which can be described as fair.39   In this posture, fairness review does not and cannot 
guarantee that the shareholders get the functional equivalent of a transaction at arm’s length.   
Suppose, however, that we add the “fair process” leg of the two-part fairness test applied 
by today’s Delaware courts.40 In the hypothesized case, fair process implies full disclosure of the 
existence of the conflict and material transactional facts41 by the insider counterparty, along with  
an unbiased corporate decisionmaker attempting in good faith to ascertain the best interest of the 
shareholders.  This addition of process review leaves the shareholders at less of a structural 
disadvantage.  But it does not assure them of an arm’s-length result.  Even given full disclosure, 
the structural bias account negates the very existence of the sought-for neutral corporate 
decisionmaker.  
  
 
39 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. CORP. L. 997, 998-99 (1988). 
40 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
41 See Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1000-1001. 
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D. Conclusion 
Marsh and Clark came to a common conclusion favoring per se prohibition of self-dealing 
transactions,42 an approach rarely seen in corporate law policy discussions today.43  Even so, their 
per se approach made eminent sense, given their assumptions and descriptive findings.  Self-
dealing transactions were unlikely to benefit the shareholders and were rarely necessary for the 
effectuation of the business plan.  Internal processes were likely to fail to assure that they had 
replicated an arm’s-length result.  Backstop judicial review could ameliorate the process problem 
but could not solve it.  Prohibition (with a loophole for a showing of the rare transaction that was 
essential to the effectuation of the business plan) was the only available legal result that adequately 
addressed the problem.  Marsh’s historical account bolstered this conclusion: prohibition’s once-
upon-a-time prevalence much enhanced its plausibility in a modern policy case. 
II. EVOLUTIONARY EROSION—PHASE FOUR 
Dean Clark, publishing in 1986, suggested that a fourth phase in the history of erosion of 
fiduciary constraints already might have begun.  He referred to California Corporations Code 
section 31044—California’s statutory safe harbor provision for self-dealing transactions.  The 
section, he said, “could be read to exclude the need for a self-dealing transaction to pass a judicial 
 
42 The approach has since disappeared but was evident in forward thinking regarding corporate law duties during the 
1970s and 1980s.  See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE 
L.J. 1354 (1978) (suggesting that all going-private transactions be prohibited); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. 
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974) (suggesting that gains 
resulting from mergers of subsidiaries into parent corporations be divided equally between the parent and the 
subsidiary by a percentage of premerger values); Marvin A. Chirelstein, Towards a Federal Fiduciary Standards 
Act, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 203 (1981). 
43 Professor Evan Criddle comes closest. Criddle poses an opposition between a republican approach keyed to 
prohibition in the teeth of empowerment and a classical liberal approach that accommodates with an eye to 
compensating beneficiaries for injuries received.  He approves of the former and disapproves of the latter.  Evan 
Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993 (2017).  In line with the 
literature, there is even a Delaware stab in the back, id. at 999:  
Inspired by classical liberalism, the Delaware Supreme Court has replaced the no-conflict and noprofit 
rules in corporate law with an “entire fairness” test that allows corporate directors to conclude self-
interested transactions without the consent of either the corporation's disinterested directors or its 
shareholders. The past two decades have also seen a growing number of states discard the no-conflict and 
no-profit rules in agency law and parts of trust law. These departures from fiduciary law's traditional 
requirements have been premised on the idea that courts should intervene in fiduciary relationships only as 
strictly necessary to rescue beneficiaries from material harm. 
44 CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (Dec. 17, 2020, 9:25 A.M.), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=CORP&division=1.&title=1.&part=&ch
apter=3.&article=. 
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test for fairness.”45  Given this reading, it would follow that approval by a disinterested director 
majority could import business judgment as the standard of review.  The statute, thus interpreted, 
imposed management’s view of the matter46 and arguably took evolutionary erosion a further step 
downward.    
Argument over the meaning of statutes like California section 310 would continue for 
another two decades.  Even today there remains much confusion as regards the interrelation of the 
bundle of factors that come to bear on the legal status of self-dealing transactions—common law 
voidability, fairness review, business judgment protection, and the interplay of common and 
statutory law.  Indeed, this is as confusing a subject matter as exists in corporate law.  But today 
there is no doubt as regards the bottom line: in Delaware and in many other states, approval by a 
disinterested (or, alternatively, independent47) board majority imports business judgment as the 
standard of review; judicial review for fairness, always available during the third phase according 
to Marsh, now can be cut off in the boardroom.  This development amounts to an emphatic 
lawmaking rejection of the academic view of self-dealing transactions described in Part I.  And it 
does indeed carry evolutionary erosion to the lower, fourth phase predicted by Clark. 
This Part dissects the fourth phase, focusing on Delaware law.  Section A recounts 
Delaware’s path from fairness review to business judgment treatment.  It turns out that, with the 
benefit of hindsight, we can fix the key moment in this evolution with the decision of Aronson v. 
Lewis48 in 1984, two years before the publication of the Clark treatise.  Confusion continued, 
because Aronson was a common law development and questions long persisted regarding the 
common law’s interaction with section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the 
statutory safe harbor provision for self-dealing transactions,. 49   The discussion that follows 
highlights a strategy for  reading the two sources of law together consistently.  Section B looks to 
other aspects of corporate fiduciary law—the process rules governing shareholder derivative 
actions and the intermediate scrutiny brought to be bear on mergers and acquisitions—to show that 
evolutionary erosion is indeed well advanced in the fourth phase.   
 
45 See CLARK, supra note 252, § 5.1 at 160. 
46 See supra text accompanying note 311.  
47 “Disinterested” should be distinguished from “independent.”   
48 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
49 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, sec. § 144. 
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A.  The Downward Path to Business Judgment Review 
We begin with Delaware’s safe harbor statute and the question of interpretation it poses.  
Section 144 starts out by describing director self-dealing transactions and transactions between 
interlocked boards.  It then holds out the possibility of validation: no such transaction “shall be 
void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at or 
participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, 
or solely because any such director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such purpose” if one of 
three conditions is fulfilled.  The conditions are: under section 144(a)(1), good faith approval by 
the “affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors,” even though the disinterested 
directors be “less than a quorum,” upon disclosure of all material facts concerning the director’s 
interest and the transaction; or, under 144(a)(2), good faith approval by a vote of the stockholders 
entitled to vote thereon upon disclosure of all material facts concerning the director’s interest and 
the transaction; or, under 144(a)(3), the transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is 
authorized, approved, or ratified.   
 1. Narrow and Broad Readings. 
 There are narrow and broad readings of section 144.  We begin with the narrow reading, 
under which the sole purpose of the section, which was first enacted in 1967, is to close off the 
common law route to per se voidability.  To see how section 144 does this, return to the voidability 
regime described in Marsh’s phase two, under which a fair transaction that has not been ratified 
by the shareholders can be subject to voidability at the option of the company if the transaction 
has been approved by an interested director majority.  Section 144 holds out alternative paths 
around this result.  First, section (1) makes it possible to validate the transaction in the boardroom, 
even though a majority of the directors is interested.  One simply has the interested directors 
abstain from voting.  The barrier to voidability rises so long as a majority of the voting (and 
disinterested) directors approves.  Note that, reading the section literally, this result obtains even 
if there is only a single disinterested director.50   Second, section (3) leaves open a door to judicial 
validation for fairness however infirm the approval process within the corporation.     
 
50 Some states make this explicit.  See N.J.STAT.ANN. 14A:6-8(1)(b).  The Model Business Corporation Act requires 
a minimum of two disinterested directors.  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAW, 
DEFINITIVE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.62(a) (March 2020) [hereinafter cited as MBCA]. 
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 Under the narrow reading, the statute only comes to bear only when a corporation (or a 
representative plaintiff suing on the corporation’s behalf) seeks to (or asks a court to) void the 
contract; that is, it operates only in the territory of per se voidability described in Marsh’s phases 
one and two.  The statute does not come to bear in either a lawsuit for damages due to a breach of 
the duty of loyalty by a director or officer who is party to a self-dealing contract or in a lawsuit to 
set aside such a contract on the ground of breach of fiduciary duty.  Note that the narrow reading 
is quite compatible with the section’s language:  the statute addresses itself to voidness or 
voidability “solely for th[e] reason” of the director’s interest or as the result of the interested 
director’s participation in the boardroom approval process, something that matters only in the 
context of per se voidability.   
 There are two problems with the narrow reading.  The first stems from Marsh’s 
characterization of phase three, under which per se avoidability has been removed from the table 
and courts always can review for fairness.  To the extent that Marsh’s characterization is accurate, 
the statute does no work and the legislature has made what amounts to an idle gesture.  The second 
problem comes from the management interest, which wants the statute to be read to have 
significant defensive properties in present-day fiduciary lawsuits.  Under the narrow reading, the 
statute plays only a marginal defensive role, for the manager who procures disinterested director 
approval still faces a common law action for breach of fiduciary duty and attendant fairness 
scrutiny. 
We now turn to the broad reading.  Under this reading, the statute applies to suits for breach 
of fiduciary duty in addition to suits to void the agreement.  The reading confronts a facial linguistic 
barrier, for the proponent has to disregard its “solely for this reason” language.  But the broad 
reading otherwise is literal.  It elevates 144(a)(1) to an outcome-determinative role in fiduciary 
litigation.  The means to this end is a disjunctive reading of the (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) 
alternatives.  Under the reading, any of the three—disinterested boardroom approval, shareholder 
ratification, or a judicial fairness ruling—validates the transaction in the context of fiduciary 
review.  The fact that the three sections are connected by “; or” (semi-colon, then or) stoutly 
supports the reading.  When the smoke clears, disinterested director approval in the boardroom 
based on full disclosure validates the transaction and cuts off a duty of loyalty lawsuit. It follows 
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logically that the standard of review in such a case is business judgment, even though the section 
makes no reference to the business judgment rule. 
2. Results from Outside of Delaware.  
Which reading is correct?  The question has come up in numerous states with 144-type 
sections in their corporate codes.  The answers vary from state to state and from statute to statute, 
for the statutes’ linguistic formulations differ, along with judicial attitudes.   
Hypothesize a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty respecting a self-dealing transaction 
approved by a majority of disinterested directors after full disclosure.  It is a case of first impression 
under a statute identical to section 144.  The plaintiff argues that the transaction is unfair and asks 
the court so to rule.  Defendant invokes the broad reading and argues that the transaction is berthed 
in a statutory safe harbor.  Assume that the judge views boardroom validation processes to be 
intrinsically infirm due to structural bias and suspects that lawyers who customarily represent 
managers both drafted the statute and shepherded it through the legislature.   
Such judges have gotten to fairness review two ways.  The first route is to apply the narrow 
reading.51  This is very easy to do linguistically but harder to do as a policy matter, for, as we have 
seen, to apply the narrow reading is to imply that the legislature was wasting its time when enacting 
the section.  That objection could be answered by going back to Marsh and rereading him carefully.  
As we have seen, he did not deny that per se invalidity remained on the common law books.  He 
just referred to statues and charter provisions in the section 144 mold to argue that per se invalidity 
no longer presented a real problem.52  Thus reread, Marsh supports a narrow reading of the statute: 
it is there to alleviate residual practitioner concerns about old cases. 
The second route is more difficult, linguistically.  The judge applies the broad reading and 
holds that the section covers actions for breach of fiduciary duty in addition to actions to void.  But 
the judge nonetheless refuses to read the three subsections disjunctively, holding that fairness 
review remains available because “; or” means “; and” in this case.53  The further explanation is 
that blocking fairness review in an action for breach of fiduciary duty is an historically momentous 
 
51 See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d, 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952)(applying the narrow 
reading but also holding that fairness review is always available under the narrow reading). 
52 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
53 See, e.g., Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F.Supp. 44, 66-69 (D.N.J. 1974); Cookies Food Products v. Lakes 
Warehouse, 430 N.W. 2d 447 (Iowa 1988). 
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step to take.  One therefore requires more in the way of a linguistic instruction from the legislature 
than the section’s two “semi-colon or” connectors,54 particularly given the possibility of a narrow 
reading.  Note that, under section 144, these linguistic acrobatics could be avoided just by adopting 
the narrow reading.  At the same time, in a state in which the statute omits the “solely for this 
reason” language, this strategy could be the only plausible alternative that preserves judicial review 
of self-dealing transactions. 
Legislatures have been known to amend their safe harbor statutes in the wake of judicial 
readings in both modes. They sometimes have ratified the court55 and other times have overruled 
it.56  But the drift favors the broad reading and business judgment review in fiduciary contexts.  
The drafting history of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) provides a focal point 
example.  The MBCA’s safe harbor has evolved from a statute susceptible to the narrow reading57 
to a statute explicitly incorporating the broad reading and simultaneously making it clear that 
disinterested director approval triggers a business judgment standard of review.58 
3. Delaware’s Straddle. 
 
54 See Brudney, supra note 31, at 214-215. 
55 See WEST’S ANN. CAL. CORP. CODE §310, Legislative Committee Comments (1975)(“There is an additional 
requirement that the transaction be just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is approved, which is 
intended to codify a judicial decision indicating that the courts in any event will review the transaction for fairness 
[Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandinni Co., 241 P.2d 66, 109 C.A.2d 405 (1952)]”). 
56 See  N.J.STAT.ANN. 14A:6-8, Commissioner’s Comment 1988 Amendments (1988)(“The one case dealing with 
this provision, Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F.Supp. 44, 66-69 (D.N.J. 1974), construed the word “or” in the prior 
statutory provision in the conjunctive, rather than the disjunctive, thus requiring the statutory criterion of “fairness” 
in every case. This revision to Section 14A:6-8 reflects what the Commission viewed to be a better reading of the 
section.”) 
 For further discussion of the caselaw, see Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory Responses to 
Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW.  201 
(1977); Brudney, supra note 31, at 214-215, 228-229. 
57 For the first version, see MBCA § 41 cmt. (1969)(stating that the statute's function is “not to provide a basis for 
validating for all purposes a contract or transaction . . . but simply to establish that such a contract or transaction is 
not automatically voidable solely by reason of the director's interest,” and that “in all other respects equitable 
principles continue to be applicable.”).  For the second version, see MBCA § 8.31 cmt. (1985)(stating that the “sole 
purpose of § 8.31 is to sharply limit the common law principle of automatic voidability” and that obtaining consent 
“does not... [make] the transaction automatically valid”). 
58 See MBCA §§ 8.61(b), 8.62 (barring equitable relief, damage awards, or other sanctions in a proceeding by a 
shareholder in respect of a self-dealing transaction given full disclosure and approval by a disinterested majority of 
at least two directors). 
 The American Law Institute’s model statute stands in contrast.  It also presupposes the broad reading.  But 
it stops short of shrouding disinterested director approval in the business judgment rule.  To avoid the business 
judgment result it interpolates an intermediate scrutiny: the approving director must have been able “reasonably [to] 
have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation.”  See AMER. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOV. § 
5.02(a)(2)(B)(1994). 
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 The Delaware caselaw adopts both the narrow and broad readings.  This sounds 
incongruous and certainly is confusing.  But we can at least attempt to make the resulting straddle 
intelligible by reference to the context.   
(a) Legislative intent.  We begin with the intent of the legislature that first adopted section 
144.  Here, commentators attribute to the legislature the intent of the drafter of the 1967 revisions 
to Delaware’s code, Professor Ernest Folk.  Folk commented on section 144 in his own writing.  
Commentary on those comments in turn holds out competing statements of Folk’s intent.  The 
leading article on interested director safe harbor statutes opines with certainty that Folk intended 
the section to “validate” the transactions for all purposes, and not just to block a per se taint.59  
Distinguished members of the Delaware bar opine with equal certainty that, when Folk said 
“validate,” he referred only to the possibility of blocking per se invalidation and not actions for 
breach of the duty of loyalty.60 
(b) Common law treatment of the duty of loyalty compared.  Reference to the intent of the 
legislature having turned out to be unhelpful, let us now flesh out the legal background, making 
reference to the Delaware courts’ articulation of a common law of judicial review of self-dealing 
transactions and other disloyal conduct, a caselaw that covers the same territory as section 144 but 
also extends beyond.  The existence of a second and parallel common law track is confusing, but 
unavoidable.  Section 144 covers only completed transactions between the corporation and its 
directors or officers and transactions between companies with interlocked boards.61  The realm of 
actionable fiduciary misconduct is much broader, covering any action injurious to the corporation 
whether or not involving a completed transaction.62  It follows that section 144 cannot possibly 
 
59 See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 56, at 212 (noting that Folk distinguished section 144 from the narrow 
interpretation applied by the California court to its own statute in Remillard Brick).  
60 See R. Franklin Balotti, Donald A. Bussard & Thomas A. Uebler, The (Mis)application of Section 144, 26-SPG 
DEL. LAW. 22, 26 DEL. LAW. 1 (Spring 2008)(referring to Ernest L. Folk III, The Delaware General Corporation 
Law: A Commentary and Analysis 82 (1972): “A contract or transaction covered by the statute is not void or 
voidable solely because those approving a transaction have a conflict of interest. . . . The validating effect does not 
go beyond removing the spectre of voidability. . . .”).  See also Blake Rohrbacher, John Mark Zeberkiewicz & 
Thomas A. Uebler, Finding Safe Harbor: Clarifying the Limited Application of Section 144, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
719, 723-724 (2008) (citing ERNEST L. FOLK, III, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 67 
(1967), and quoting the following: “The need for loosening the traditional common law restrictions on interested 
director transactions has been recognized in decisions validating by-laws varying the common law rules. These more 
flexible procedures clearly ‘fill a legitimate need in the efficient functioning of the corporate enterprise.”’). 
61 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, sec. § 144(a). 
62 In Delaware, a director may be held liable for breach of the duty of loyalty in the absence of a personal benefit.  
See Strasburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 581 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
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preempt the common law entirely even as it might displace its zone of operation as regards self-
dealing transactions.   
A strong implication favoring the narrow reading promptly arises.  The logic is that only 
the common law can provide a unitary and exclusive source of law when questions arise 
concerning breaches of the duty of loyalty.  Further reference to section 144 in the subset of 
fiduciary cases concerning completed self-dealing transactions only imports confusion.  
Furthermore, pace Marsh, the enacting legislature was not wasting its time, for there were 
reasonably recent cases of per se invalidation on Delaware’s books at the time of section 144’s 
enactment,63 importing credibility to a narrow reading of the legislature’s motivation.  
What then does Delaware’s common law have to say about the big question arising under 
section 144—the one concerning business judgment review in fiduciary litigation respecting 
transactions approved by a majority independent board? Here the touchstone is the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s 1984 opinion in Aronson v. Lewis, which reformulated the judicial standard 
governing the dismissal of a complaint in a shareholder derivative action for failure to make a 
demand on the board of directors.  If demand is deemed “futile,” it is excused and the complaint 
survives a motion to dismiss.  Under Aronson, demand can be deemed futile based on specific 
allegations in the complaint, as follows:  
“. . . [T]he Court of Chancery . . . must decide whether, under the particularized 
facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and 
independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid 
exercise of business judgment. Hence, the Court of Chancery must make two inquiries, one 
into the independence and disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the 
substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board’s approval thereof. . . .  As 
to the former inquiry, directorial independence and disinterestedness, the court reviews the 
factual allegations to decide whether they raise a reasonable doubt, as a threshold matter, 
that the protections of the business judgment rule are available to the board.  Certainly, if 
 
63 See Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 602-03 (Del. 1948) (“Therefore, if during the course 
of a meeting a matter arises involving a Director’s personal interest, a new count of those present should be had to 
determine whether or not a quorum exists without the interested Director.”); Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 
652, 658 (Del. 1952) (finding that, because a profit-sharing plan was approved by only three disinterested directors 
on an eight-person board, “the plan failed to receive a legal majority of the directors’ votes in its favor”). 
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this is an “interested” director transaction, such that the business judgment rule is 
inapplicable to the board majority approving the transaction, then the inquiry ceases. In 
that event futility of demand has been established by any objective or subjective 
standard.”64   
The test later would be restated in the disjunctive, with an “or” substituted for the “and” between 
(1) and (2) above.65   
 Aronson, in laying down a pleading specificity requirement for a derivative plaintiff, 
implies something about the operation of the business judgment rule on a self-dealing fact pattern.  
Simply, if a majority of “disinterested and independent” directors approved the transaction, then 
the business judgment rule applies to protect it.66  The implication gradually took hold as common 
law.  It accordingly has become the practice in Delaware fiduciary litigation for the court to 
examine each member of the approving board for disinterest and independence.  Given majority 
independence at the conclusion of this count, the standard of review is business judgment, and the 
transaction is highly likely to pass inspection; given majority interest or dependence, the plaintiff 
gets by a motion to dismiss, business judgment protection does not obtain, and the court proceeds 
to review for fairness.67 
 Thus read, Aronson ushered in the business judgment review of self-dealing transactions 
as a common law proposition a long time ago.  One can even track the common law line of 
authority farther back than Aronson.  A 1971 Chancery Court decision states flatly that business 
judgment review follows from approval by a majority disinterested board.68  The 1981 decision of 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado69 strongly implies the same thing when it holds that a board of 
directors has the power to terminate a derivative suit70 subject to modified business judgment 
 
64 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984) 
65 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). 
66 See Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 32, at 42 n.9 (Del. 1993); Cinerama, Inc. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1154 (Del. Ch. 1994). 
67 See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009); In re INFOUSA, 953 A.2d 963 (Del.Ch. 
2007)(conducting an individual count of the members of a board in connection with demand futility); Beneville v. 
York, 769 A.2d 80 (Del.Ch. 2000)(holding that one member of a two member board did not suffice to establish an 
independent board majority for demand excusal purposes). 
68 Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971)(holding that approval by an independent majority yields business 
judgment scrutiny in a case where a 46 percent shareholder controlled four out of nine seats). 
69 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
70 Id. at 785. 
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review given delegation of the matter to a special committee of independent directors.  The limiting 
modification, inserted due to worries about structural bias in the boardroom,71 was left to the 
discretion of the Chancery Court, which was authorized to substitute its own business judgment 
for that of the board in the proper case.72 The modification by no means cuts off the implication 
that self-dealing transactions can lie in business judgment territory.  If independent directors can 
terminate an otherwise well-pleaded derivative action subject to business judgment review (in the 
Chancellor’s discretion), then the business judgment envelope also contains their approval of the 
underlying transaction and an attacking shareholder cannot invoke fairness scrutiny as of right.  
 Let us now return to section 144 to reconsider the broad reading in light of the common 
law.  Awkward questions about the application of section 144 in the area of overlap crop up 
immediately because the two sources of law do not align perfectly, even as they roughly parallel 
one another.  Section 144(a)(1) speaks only of “disinterested” directors, where post-Aronson 
common law more strictly demands “disinterest and independence.”  Disinterest goes to the 
connection between the particular director and the transaction—a director is “interested” when he 
or she stands to gain monetarily while other shareholders do not.”73  In Delaware common law, 
“independence” is a contextual inquiry directed to the director’s connection to the company, its 
CEO, and its large shareholders.   The question is whether a director, although lacking a direct 
financial interest in the matter, is somehow “beholden” to an interested colleague or otherwise 
likely to decide based on “personal or extraneous considerations,” rather than in the best interest 
of the corporation. 74  It follows that, given the broad reading, section 144(a)(1) could yield 
business judgment review for a transaction where the common law would not, for the approving 
directors could be “disinterested” in the transaction but still beholden more broadly.   
 The common law and section 144 are misaligned on other ways as well.  Majority approval 
tabulations work differently.  Section 144 contemplates approval by a disinterested minority of a 
 
71 Id. at 787 (“[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation 
and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members. The 
question naturally arises whether a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ empathy might not play a role.”) 
72 Id. at 788. 
73 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that “directors can neither appear on both sides of a 
transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a 
benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally”).  Note that if a director is interested, the 
director is by definition self-dealing. 
74 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993). 
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majority interested board, where the common law looks for a majority independent board.  (It is 
noted that under the common law a majority interested board could still validate a transaction for 
fiduciary purposes by delegating the matter to an independent committee of itself.75)  Finally, 
shareholder ratification may work differently.  At common law, interested shareholder votes do 
not count, and a majority of disinterested shareholders is needed to shift the standard of review.  
Section 144(a)(2) asks for a “good faith vote of the stockholders”76 but goes no further, possibly 
counting interested votes.77 
 A clear doctrinal message emerges from the comparison: the only way to make Delaware 
work consistently is to adopt the narrow reading of section 144.  Delaware courts have shown keen 
awareness of this point, even as they assiduously have held back from making a caselaw holding.  
Three explanations are possible.  First, a mixed interpretation enhances judicial elbow room.  
Second, for many years, a clear-cut adoption of the broad reading would have attracted unwelcome 
criticism from academics and other advocates of the shareholder interest. Third, and contrariwise, 
a clear-cut adoption of the narrow reading would discomfit the management interest.  A close look 
at the cases confirms all three explanations. 
 (c) Cases under section 144: 1976-1996.  The line of cases applying section 144 starts off 
with the narrow reading in a dictum in a 1976 Supreme Court case.78  The Chancery Court, also 
in a dictum, again confirmed the narrow reading a decade later.79  Then, in 1991 and in yet another 
dictum, the Supreme Court turned to the broad reading and a business judgment standard of review, 
conditioning it on the use of a special committee of independent directors.80  The Chancery Court 
 
75 See 8 DEL. CODE ANN., tit 8, §141(c).  See also Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 971 (Del. Ch. 1985) (holding that 
conclusions of a one-person special litigation committee would be acceptable if the committee is independent, acts 
in good faith, and shows a reasonable basis for its conclusions), appeal denied sub nom. Fuqua Indus. v. Lewis, 504 
A.2d 571 (Del. 1986). 
76 8 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §144(a)(2). 
77 See In re Cox Communications Shareholders Litigation, 879 A.2d 604, 615 (Del.Ch. 2005).  But cf. In re 
Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del Ch. 1995)(opining that 
shareholder ratification within section 144(a)(2) requires a majority of disinterested shareholders). 
78 Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976). 
79 Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-404 (Del. Ch. 1987).  Meanwhile, Chancellor Allen opined as follows in 
Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc. 505 A.2d 757, 763-64 (Del. Ch. 1986): “Self-dealing transactions by corporate 
officers, directors or controlling shareholders are not prohibited by Delaware law. Indeed, our statute provides 
specific special procedures that may be employed to remove the taint that any such transaction may possess solely 
by reason of its self-interested character. See 8 Del.C. § 144.”  As between the two readings, this comment does not 
take a clear position. 
80 Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991)(“At common law, a corporation's stockholders did have the 
power to nullify an interested transaction, although considerations of the transaction's fairness appear to have played 
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took this line of interpretation a step farther in its next dicta four years later.  This time, a majority 
of “independent and disinterested” directors could procure business judgment review under section 
144. Note that, with these pronouncements, the common law insistence on independence (as 
opposed to disinterest taken alone) seeps into section 144, despite the section’s wording to the 
contrary.  The Chancery Court moved similarly as regards shareholder ratification, specifying a 
majority of disinterested stockholders under 144(a)(2). 81   The courts, in short, were quietly 
undertaking the job of bringing the common law and section 144 into alignment. 
 Meanwhile, the first Chancery Court pronouncement that could not be dismissed as 
dictum 82  had been made a year earlier, in the famous 1994 remand of Cinerama, Inc. v. 
Technicolor, Inc.83 The question, which the reversing Supreme Court had requested the Chancery 
Court to answer, was whether one or more of the directors approving a merger agreement had an 
“interest” in the transaction within the meaning of section 144.  Chancellor Allen ruled as follows: 
The Supreme Court has mandated that this court consider the applicability of Section 144 
of the General Corporation Law to the facts as found. As the Court noted, the application 
of that provision was not argued before this court. That statute does not deal with the 
question when will a financial interest of one or more directors cast on the board the 
burdens and risks of the entire fairness form of judicial review. Rather it deals with the 
related problem of the conditions under which a corporate contract can be rendered “un-
voidable” solely by reason of a director interest. . . . [A]s construed by our Supreme Court 
recently compliance with the terms of Section 144 does not restore to the board the 
presumption of the business judgment rule; it simply shifts the burden to plaintiff to prove 
 
some part in judicial decisions applying this rule.  See, e.g., Potter v. Sanitary Co. of Am., Del.Ch., 194 A. 87 
(1937); see also Marciano v. Nakash, Del.Supr., 535 A.2d 400, 403 (1987). The enactment of 8 Del.C. § 144 in 
1967 limited the stockholders' power in two ways. First, section 144 allows a committee of disinterested directors to 
approve a transaction and bring it within the scope of the business judgment rule. Second, where an independent 
committee is not available, the stockholders may either ratify the transaction or challenge its fairness in a judicial 
forum, but they lack the power automatically to nullify it. When a challenge to fairness is raised, the directors carry 
the burden of ‘establishing ... [the transaction's] entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the 
courts.’”) 
81 Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1995) (director approval); In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del Ch. 1995)(shareholder ratification).  Wheelabrator, which cites 
Marciano, see id., can be read as adopting the narrow interpretation.  But the matter is not free from doubt because 
the opinion also mentions a burden shifting effect and a shift of the reviewing standard to waste. 
82 The pronouncement was not necessary to decide the case so cannot be called holding.  But it cannot be brushed 
off as unnecessary because the Supreme Court required the Chancellor to make the pronouncement.   
83 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994). 
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unfairness.  See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Del.Supr., 638 A.2d 1110 
(1994).84 
In this ruling, Chancellor Allen combined the broad and narrow readings.  His reading started out 
squarely narrow, when it noted that section 144 did not apply to the fact pattern at hand and 
concerned per se invalidity.  But it went broader when ascribing a burden-shifting effect to the 
section.  The reason that the interpolation of burden-shifting went with the broad reading is that 
the burden-shifting is something that happens only in the context of an action for breach of 
fiduciary duty, which lies entirely on the broad side of the line.85  The interpretation was doubly 
interesting for its citation of Kahn v. Lynch86 as the controlling case on the meaning of section 144.  
That was a majority-to-minority fiduciary duty case, not a director to corporation self-dealing case.  
It accordingly did not lie in section 144 territory.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s Kahn v. Lynch 
opinion nowhere mentions section 144.   
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court on appeal commented that, with the above-quoted 
language, “the Court of Chancery properly began its consideration of Section 144.”87  It went on 
to concede that section 144 did not in fact apply to the facts of Cinerama, but could be viewed as 
a source of general principles in common law contexts.  As such, section 144 just happened to 
dovetail with Aronson, providing authority for the proposition that disinterested and independent 
majority board approval secured business judgment review.  Thus did the Supreme Court in the 
end take us back to the full-dress broad reading even as it approved as proper the Chancellor’s 
narrow and halfway broad readings.88  Meanwhile, the Chancery began to apply section 144 in 
partly narrow-partly broad (with burden shifting) mode described by Chancellor Allen.89 
Let us pause to sum up. We have covered twenty years.  At the start, the Delaware courts 
were asked to choose between two inconsistent readings of section 144: broad and narrow.  At the 
end, the Delaware courts had added a third reading—mixed broad and narrow with burden-
 
84 Id. at 1153-1154. 
85 There is a technical reason for this.  Under the narrow reading, satisfaction of 144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2) ends the 
invalidity case in the transaction’s favor.  There is no call to consider fairness and no inquiry into burdens. 
86 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
87 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1169 (Del. 1995). 
88 It bears noting that in the opinion remanding Technicolor to Chancellor Allen, the Supreme Court discussed 
section 144 in terms most consonant with the narrow reading.  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 
365–366 (Del. 1993).  Then, in a footnote, it adopted the broad reading.  Id. at 366 n. 34. 
89 See In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del Ch. 1995). 
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shifting.  In one or another case the Delaware courts had given their imprimatur to all three 
readings.  There may even have been four readings, with the fourth invoking the statute not as a 
directive but as a flexible, caselaw-like bundle of principles.  
The straddle would continue.  
 (d) Cases under section 144 from 1997.  
 In 1997, the Chancery Court applied section 144 for the first time in deciding a case for 
breach of fiduciary duty (and posing no question concerning per se invalidity).  The case was 
Cooke v. Oolie.90  The Court made no mention of the possibility of a narrow reading and employed 
the broad reading but interpolated burden-shifting in place of business judgment as the 
consequence of successful invocation of section 144(a)(1).91     
The other readings did not disappear in the case’s wake, however.  Two years later, in 
HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. v. Gray,92 (then) Vice Chancellor Strine continued the use of 144 
as case-like precedent.  HMG was a common law case in which an interested director had not 
disclosed his interest to the reviewing board but argued that under the common law (as opposed to 
section 144(a)(1)) such disclosure was unnecessary.  The court turned to the section 144(a)(1) 
requirement of disclosure of director interest as a source of law, even though it did not apply the 
section to the facts of the case.  Vice Chancellor Strine also invoked the broad reading in reaching 
this result.93  Six years later, he would again comment on section 144 in his Cox Communications 
opinion.94 But this time he would pay his respects to the body of practitioner literature stating the 
case for the narrow reading and go on to identify points of misalignment between the 144 and 
 
90 Cooke v. Oolie, 1997 WL 367034 (Del.Ch.).  The complaint alleged waste, misappropriation, and breach of the 
duty of care.  Id. at *2.  Two years earlier, in In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 663 A.2d 
1194, 1203 (Del Ch. 1995), the Chancery Court had supplemented a common law opinion regarding the effect of 
shareholder ratification with a footnote to section 144 noting that the section “also” reached the same result.  Id. at 
1204 n. 8. 
91 The court, having sustained the process case for application of 144(a)(1), granted summary judgment to 
defendants because the plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden to show the transactions unfair.  1997 WL 367034, 
at *9-*11. 
92 749 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
93 Id. at 112-114. 
94 In re Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 879 A.2d 604 (Del.Ch. 2005). 
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common law treatments.95  It is not clear whether he discussed the practitioner literature with 
approval, but the implication does arise.96   
 Section 144 was applied in deciding a case for a second time in 2005 in Benihana of Tokyo, 
Inc. v. Benihana, Inc. 97  Vice Chancellor Parsons applied three of the readings approved in 
Supreme Court opinions in a heroic attempt to synchronize 144 and the common law.  The 
resulting structure does not quite work, analytically speaking.  But, in view of the variegated 
character of the caselaw background, the attempt commands complete respect.   
Vice-Chancellor Parsons begins with the narrow reading:  144(a) only averts per se 
invalidity. Fiduciary review and determination whether the standard of review is business 
judgment or fairness proceeds on a different common law track.98  Within 144, if a defendant 
establishes the applicability of  either of 144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2), the result is to forestall invalidation 
due to director interest and to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff in order to prove the 
transaction unfair and thus invalidate it.  Further, if 144(a)(1) compliance is shown, the interested 
director’s interest in the transaction does not forestall application of the business judgment rule.99  
Finally, the Vice Chancellor noted that establishment of compliance with 144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2) 
does not yield business judgment review, for that is a matter for the separate fiduciary track.100   
 Cut through all of the above and one emerges with an approach grounded in the 
narrow reading, which is a good approach from the point of view of the coherence of Delaware 
corporate law.  Two lingering problems remain, however.  First, the court’s interpolation of a 
burden shift on fairness within section 144 (read narrowly) based on satisfaction of (a)(1) or (a)(2) 
is questionable (albeit in accord with the precedent).  Under the narrow reading, the only question 
is per se invalidation due to approval by a majority-interested board.  A showing by the 
transaction’s proponent of either disinterested director approval or shareholder ratification cures 
that problem; there is no occasion for further reference to fairness or unfairness with the context 
of section 144.  Contrariwise, if the proponent fails to satisfy (a)(1) or (a)(2), it still has a chance 
 
95 Id. at 614-615, citing David A. Drexler, Lewis S. Black & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, DEL. CORP. L.& PRACTICE, § 
15.05[2] at 15–22 (2004). 
96 See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 499, 504 (2002). 
97 891 A.2d 150 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
98 Id. at 173-174. 
99 Id.at 173. 
100 Id. at 185. 
33 
 
to avert per se invalidation by showing fairness.  It follows that the three section 144(a) alternatives 
should be read literally and disjunctively; either disinterested director approval or shareholder 
ratification should end the matter of per se invalidity.  Second, the court’s reference to the business 
judgment rule in connection with satisfaction of 144(a)(1) is surplusage.  The topic being per se 
invalidation, business judgment at no point comes into play; the contract is valid or invalid by 
virtue of the taint, whatever the quality of the boardroom decision process.  But these are quibbles.  
Benihana left the Delaware law of self-dealing transactions in its most coherent shape for two 
generations.  The result is that voidability due to the taint is alive and well in Delaware law.  But, 
very much in line with Marsh, getting to voidness will as a practical matter will take a showing of 
unfairness and hardly seems worth the trouble.   
The story continues.  The Benihana plaintiff appealed a few issues.  Affirming by reference 
to the facts, the Delaware Supreme Court in passing combined 144(a)(1) with a business judgment 
standard of review, which was not the approach taken by the Chancery Court.101 The Court’s 
accompanying doctrinal pronouncement could, but need not, be read as consistent with the broad 
reading.102  In any event, the broad and narrow readings continue their uneasy parallel subsistence 
in subsequent cases.103 
 
101 Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114 (Del. Supr. 2006).   
102 Id. at 120 (“Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides a safe harbor for interested 
transactions, like this one, if ‘[t]he material facts as to the director’s ... relationship or interest and as to the contract 
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors ... and the board ... in good faith authorizes the 
contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors....’ After approval by 
disinterested directors, courts review the interested transaction under the business judgment rule, which ‘is a 
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.’” ) 
103 In Valeant Pharmaceuticals International v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007), the Chancery Court applies 
the narrow reading and finds the transaction fails to satisfy any of the three conditions of the section.  Voidness and 
damages follow, with a parallel action for breach of fiduciary duty acknowledged.  Id. at 750-752.   
 In a dictum in Reddy v. MBKS Co., Ltd., 945 A.2d 1080, 1087 n.15 (Del. 2008), the Supreme Court noted 
that it could void a self-dealing transaction due an approval taint unremedied under section 144.  
 Finally, in Sutherland v. Sutherland, 2009 WL 857468 (Del. Ch.), the Chancery Court rules that failure to 
satisfy 144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2) leaves the transaction “not insulated on grounds of unfairness.” Id. at *4.  The ruling is 
consistent with the narrow reading.  The case involved a three-person board, with two of the persons interested in 
the transaction and the third, disinterested director voting to approve with the interested directors abstaining.  The 
implication of the holding that 144(a)(1) is unsatisfied is that a single director cannot validate a transaction under the 
section.  This in effect interpolates the RMBCA’s minimum of two, see supra note 50, into section 144.   
 But it should be mentioned that Sutherland, in its recounting of history rejects the narrow reading and 
endorses the broad reading as follows, id. at *4, n. 13: 
Notably, before the law related to Section 144 of the DGCL finally settled, see, e.g., Benihana of Tokyo, 
Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del.2006) (providing that interested director transactions 
approved pursuant to the 144(a)(1) safe harbor are reviewed under the business judgment rule), it was 
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(e) Conclusion.  One hopes that Benihana’s quasi-narrow reading will stick in the long run.  
But very little turns on the point, for the common law now does all the work in Delaware duty of 
loyalty jurisprudence, proceeding on the track set long ago in Aronson.  That being case, perhaps 
matters best could be resolved by the Council of the Delaware Bar’s Section of Corporation Law 
the next time it undertakes a broad-based project of revision of Delaware’s corporate code.  Here 
is the proposition: if section 144 no longer does any work, then it should be repealed.  Almost 
nothing would change in consequence but for a few residual questions arising in the rare case in 
which a plaintiff claims that the corporation has a right to per se invalidity.  The Delaware courts 
are quite capable of drawing on the common law to provide answers as the occasion arises.   
 B. Additional Erosion 
The appropriateness of business judgment treatment for boardroom-approved management self-
dealing contracts has been a flashpoint issue in corporate law for decades.  When a jurisdiction 
endorses business judgment treatment it turns its back on Marsh and descends into the fourth phase 
of history predicted by Clark.104  Underscoring this rejection of Marsh, the drafters of the MBCA 
completely removed the term “fiduciary” from their code and commentary in 1984,105  apparently 
on the ground that it unjustifiably heightened expectations about the character of management 
duties. 
These developments by no means stand alone in recent history. The list of additional 
modifications is long.  Many concern process and are directed against representative litigants.  
 
frequently suggested that Section 144, in the same vein as the provision at issue, did no more than to 
remove a director's disability to participate in a quorum to vote on an interested transaction, but did nothing 
to sanitize such a transaction if it was inherently unfair. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 
(Del.1976) (“[Section 144] merely removes an ‘interested director’ cloud when its terms are met and 
provides against invalidation of an agreement ‘solely’ because such a director or officer is involved. 
Nothing in the statute sanctions unfairness ... or removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny.”); 
HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 114 n. 24 (Del.Ch.1999) (“Satisfaction of §§ 144(a)(1) 
or (a)(2) simply protects against invalidation of the transaction ‘solely’ because it is an interested one.”); 
Cooke v. Oolie, 1997 WL 367034, at *8 (Del.Ch.) (“It is now clear that even if a board's action falls within 
the safe harbor of section 144, the board is not entitled to receive the protection of the business judgment 
rule.”).  
Elsewhere, however, the Sutherland court endorses reference to Aronson as the controlling precedent. Id. at *4 n.14.   
104 For an excellent, extended treatment of this topic, see Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty, 75 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035 (2018).  
105 See Norwood P. Jr. Beveridge, The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-
Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV.  655, 656 (1992), citing MBCA, § 8.30(a) cmt. at 222 (1984).  
Reference also can be made to MBCA, subchapter F, introductory cmt. (2012)(avoiding use of the term fiduciary 
except to describe historical antecedents). 
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Aronson’s pleading specificity requirement106 substantially raised the bar confronting derivative 
plaintiffs.  Zapata’s concession of boardroom power to terminate derivative actions107 makes such 
fiduciary law as remains much more difficult to enforce.  Moreover, even as Delaware holds 
termination decisions open to second-guessing in the Chancellor’s discretion, 108  other states 
concede business judgment treatment subject only to review of the special committee’s 
independence and investigatory process.109   
Representative plaintiffs face other new hurdles as well.  Corporations now have the power 
to use their charters or bylaws to channel fiduciary litigation to the state of incorporation.110  Here, 
the generating energy comes from Delaware lawmakers working in tandem with defense counsel 
to choke off the plaintiff’s lawyers’ option of bringing shareholder suits against the managers of 
Delaware corporations in less sophisticated, more sympathetic jurisdictions.111  Delaware has also 
tightened review of nonpecuniary settlements of marginal fiduciary complaints, further reducing 
the number of cases that support evaluation as investment grade on the side of the representative 
plaintiff bar.112 
Other adjustments are substantive and go to the standard of review, echoing the move to 
business judgment treatment of management self-dealing transactions.  The majority-to-minority 
 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68. 
107 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
108 Other state states proceed similarly, but under different formulations.  See Cukor v. Mikalauskas, 547 Pa. 600, 
692 A.2d 1042 (1997)(following the ALI Principles); In re PSE&G Shareholder Litigation, 173 N.J. 258, 801 A.2d 
295 (2002)(adding reasonableness review). 
109 See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979); Boland v. Boland Trane 
Assoc, Inc., 423 Md. 296, 31 A.3d 529 (2011). 
110 See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fd. v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).  Section 115 of the 
Delaware Code, enacted after the case provides as follows: 
The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent with applicable jurisdictional 
requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all 
of the courts in this State, and no provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit 
bringing such claims in the courts of this State. “Internal corporate claims” means claims, including claims 
in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or 
officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of 
Chancery. 
DEL. CODE ANN., tit 8, § 115.  The line has been drawn at the shifting of attorney’s fees, however.  See DEL. CODE 
ANN., tit 8, § 102(f). 
111 On the shifting jurisdictional pattern, see, e.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEG. STUD. 605 (2012). 
112 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 2016 WL 270821 (Del. Ch.)(announcing that “disclosure only” 
settlements would no longer be approved absent certain conditions, in particular, any supplemental disclosures must 
address material misrepresentations or omissions, and the obtained by the defendants must be narrowly tailored to 
the claims relating to the disclosures). 
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shareholder fiduciary duty, until recently, implied fairness review as of right: a showing of control 
or great influence on a shareholder’s part triggered intrinsic fairness scrutiny of its transactions 
with the company.113  At the same time, either delegation to an independent committee or majority-
of-the-minority shareholder ratification earned a burden shift on the fairness question from the 
defendant to the plaintiff.114  (This was the doctrinal source of the third interpretation of section 
144 introduced by Chancellor Allen in Cinerama. 115) This long-established regime has been 
relaxed.  Under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 116  an appropriately structured decisional 
delegation to an independent committee combined with majority-of-the minority shareholder 
ratification can lead to business judgment review of a transaction between a controlling 
shareholder and the company.117   
Some of what once were fiduciary mandates have evolved into default rules.  Corporations 
may now partially negate the fiduciary duty of care with appropriate charter language blocking 
suits for damages.118  In addition, in Delaware, the actionability of corporate opportunities can be 
cut off in the charter or even by a boardroom resolution.119  Outside of the corporate form, in the 
expanding world of limited liability companies and limited partnerships, drafters can opt out of 
fiduciary duties entirely, limiting investors with grievances to the contract law of good faith.120   
 
113 The Delaware courts deem a stockholder a controlling when it either owns more than 50% of the voting 
power of a corporation or owns less than 50% of the voting power of the corporation but “exercises control 
over the business affairs of the corporation.”  Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–
14 (Del. 1994).  The showing of control proceeds on all the facts, and goes to the particular transaction being 
challenged or the corporation generally.  See Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 659 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (quoting Williamson v. Cox Commc'ns Inc., 2006 WL 1586375, at *4 (Del. Ch.)). See also In re Crimson 
Exploration Inc. S'holder Litig., 2014 WL 5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch.). 
114 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
115 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
116 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
117 88 A.3d at 653, confirming that the business judgment standard of review applies to a parent-subsidiary merger 
that cashes out minority shareholders where the merger has been conditioned upon the approval of both an 
independent and adequately-empowered special committee of directors and an uncoerced and informed vote of a 
majority of the minority stockholders. 
118 DEL. CODE ANN., tit 8, § 102(b)(7).   
119 DEL. CODE ANN., tit 8, § 122(17).   
120 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 17-1101(d)(opting out in limited partnerships); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit 18 § 18-
1101(d)(opting out in limited liability companies).  The sections were redrafted to overrule a contrary holding in 
Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002). 
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Finally, there is notable contraction of what formerly were fiduciary law’s late-20th century 
points of expansion:121 Unocal’s proportionality scrutiny of management defensive tactics,122 
Revlon’s reasonableness review of certain sell-side merger decisions,123 and Blasius’s strict review 
of management interference with the shareholder franchise.124  Unocal no longer matters, less 
because later cases bowdlerized its rule than because hostile tender offers have largely 
disappeared,125 in part due to Unocal’s sanctioning of the poison pill.126 Revlon, which originally 
was seen to require a formal auction of the company given the fulfillment of certain conditions,  
gradually has been stripped down to reasonableness review of the sell-side board’s information 
level. 127   Revlon also was seen originally as an arm of the duty of loyalty, but became 
disaggregated between duty of care fact patterns and conflict of interest fact patterns, with the 
result that duty of care opt-outs in corporate charters can block Revlon actions for damages.128  
Most recently, in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,129 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled 
that, given a loyalty-based, post-closing action for Revlon damages, business judgment is the 
appropriate standard of review for approval of the merger by a fully informed, uncoerced majority 
of the disinterested stockholders.  As a practical matter, Revlon is no longer about damages, and 
its zone of operation is largely restricted to suits for pre-closing equitable relief.  As for Blasius, it 
never did amount to much.  Its “compelling justification” review standard for interference with the 
franchise makes it intractable:  once an impairment within the rule has been shown, the case is 
basically over, and the plaintiff wins.  The courts accordingly have disfavored a resort to Blasius 
review.  Their disfavor has been notable in recent years, for even as interference cases have 
 
121 For an extended treatment of this topic see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring 
Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323 (2018) 
122 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1388 (Del.1995). 
123 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
124 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del.Ch.1988). 
125 In the dataset of cases in the Westlaw Delaware Chancery folder reported on in Part IV infra, there are only four 
cases concerning tender offers decided since 1990. 
126 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.1985) 
127 See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.1989) (stating that there is “no single blueprint that 
a board must follow to fulfill its duties.”). 
128 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001). 
129 125 A.3d 304 (2015). 
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proliferated when boards have defended against activist hedge fund proxy contests, Blasius has 
not been applied.130  
C. Conclusion 
Harold Marsh viewed judicial review for fairness as a second-best backstop to per se 
prohibition.  He had good reasons:  an intuitive cost-benefit case supported his view, and 
management domination of the governance system seemed to call for an emphatic prohibitory 
response.  Today, a half century after Marsh, judicial review for fairness is no longer available for 
properly engineered transactions arising out of “independent” processes.  Marsh likely would have 
viewed such a development as the functional equivalent of handing management the combination 
to the safe, for he did not believe that such an “independent” process could exist.  His view persists 
in the structural bias account and the still-vital academic tradition emphasizing fiduciary law’s 
evolutionary erosion of fiduciary law.131  Simply put, corporate fiduciary law is thought to have 
gone to the dogs.   
The remainder of this Article reconsiders this conclusion.   
III. THE HISTORICAL COUNTER-STORY 
The evolutionary erosion account rests on Marsh’s reading of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century cases.  The reading was challenged during the 1990s.  But in the view of most, 
Marsh’s reading emerged intact.   We now have a new and redoubled challenge.  This time the 
result is different, for the new challenge indubitably succeeds.  This Part lays out its terms, making 
further reference to the early 20th century observations of Adolf Berle, who saw nothing wrong 
with the judicial turn-away from per se invalidity to fairness review, even as he certainly worried 
about shareholder vulnerability, given separated ownership and control.     
 
130 In Yucaipa America Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d a5 A.3d 2318 (Del. 
2011), the Delaware Chancery Court refused to apply the Blasius line of cases to invalidate a poison pill with a 20 
percent ownership threshold promulgated to frustrate a proxy contestant.  The effect of the ruling was to channel 
activists objecting to management defensive tactics to the more permissive Unocal standard of review.  In a 
subsequent case, Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch.), the Chancery Court rejected a Unocal 
claim brought by an activist proxy contestant against a poison pill with an innovative 10 percent ownership 
threshold.   
131 See Velasco, supra note 104; Cox & Thomas, supra note 121; Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing 
Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903 (2011) (concluding that plaintiffs face excessively high hurdles of 
pleading and proof and recommending shifting the burdens to management). 
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A.  The Structural Inevitability of Fairness Scrutiny 
In a pair of articles published during the 1990s, Norwood Beveridge challenged Marsh’s 
account of the late 19th and early 20th century cases.132  Beveridge showed that Marsh’s description 
of a first phase in which per se prohibition reigned unchallenged was inaccurate, because cases 
that reviewed for substantive fairness and clean process also can be found during the first phase.  
Carrying this point to a logical conclusion, Beveridge asserted that a regime of absolute prohibition 
in fact had never existed.133  Marsh, he said, had misread the invalidity cases, interpolating an 
absolute rule where invalidity followed from process infirmities on the facts of the case. 134  
Subsequent commentators accepted Beveridge’s point that per se invalidity had not held exclusive 
sway during phase one.  But the Marsh account otherwise was left standing: absolute invalidity 
informed most of the cases during phase one, so the erosion account still worked.135 
Professor David Kershaw has reopened this inquiry.  He confirms Beveridge’s point that 
there never was a period in which absolute invalidity reigned alone.  He goes on to show what both 
Marsh and Beveridge deny—that absolute invalidity and fairness review co-existed during phases 
one and two, with fairness scrutiny only gradually eclipsing per se invalidity.   More important, 
Kershaw persuasively explains the joint appearance and co-existence of the two approaches.  His 
account denudes the history of the normative implications that so mesmerized Marsh and his 
successors.   
The key to Kershaw’s thesis is a comparative perspective.  He juxtaposes this country’s 
doctrinal evolution with that of the U.K..  The inquiry shows that the absolute prohibition rule 
derived from U.K. caselaw, which in the 1854 case of Aberdeen Railway v. Blaikie adopted a rule 
of voidability at the company’s option in the absence of ex ante shareholder authorization or ex 
post shareholder ratification.136  This remained the U.K. approach for long thereafter, but by no 
means resulted in a pristine environment free of self-dealing contracts, because U.K. shareholders 
proved quite willing to consent.  Once transplanted to this country, the voidability rule operated in 
 
132 Beveridge, supra note 105; Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: Validation 
under the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 97 (1999). 
133 Beveridge, supra note 105, at 659-662. 
134 Id. at 660. 
135 See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASE AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 650-651 (7th ed. 
1995); Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595. 613 n. 43 (1997).  
136 Aberdeen Ry Co. v. Blaikie, 1 Macq 461 (1854). 
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a materially different conceptual framework.  In the U.K., incorporation imported limited liability 
in a legal framework otherwise dominated by partnership concepts.137  Variation by contract was 
accepted and expected—the voidability rule was never expected actually to operate as a 
prohibition.  The conceptual framework of incorporation was very different in the U.S., where 
incorporation came with mandates derived from state chartering. 138  Where, in the U.K., the 
incorporation statute empowered the shareholders to redistribute power by contract, in the U.S.,  
corporate statutes delegated power to the board of directors without a concomitant delegation of 
power to vary statutory rules by contract.139  The adoption of the U.K.’s voidability rule in the U.S. 
thus had a very different effect.  In the mandatory environment of U.S. law, the voidability rule 
led not to self-dealing transactions based on shareholder consent, but to absolute prohibition.   
Meanwhile, Aberdeen Railway was not the only line of U.K. law on which U.S. corporate 
fiduciary law could be constructed. 140  There were also trust and agency cases in which the 
fiduciary contracted with the beneficiary, subject to fairness review.   Courts in this country also 
adapted these cases into corporate law.  By analogy to the principle that a trustee could not contract 
with itself but could contract with the beneficiary, an officer or director could contract with the 
company only if the officer or director played no role in the company’s approval of the contract 
and the contract was fair.  As we have seen,141 it followed that director self-dealing transactions 
could be sustained if approved by a majority disinterested board with the interested director not 
participating.142   
By 1880, both lines of U.K. precedent had found their way into U.S. corporate law.  The 
second line eventually came to dominate.  But, contrary to Marsh, there was no sudden lurch to 
management accommodation.  It had always been wrought into the system.  Nor did Aberdeen 
Railway suddenly disappear.  Kershaw shows that it persisted in the law of New Jersey until 
1960.143   
 
137 KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 288. 
138 Id. at 288. 
139 Id. at 302. 
140 Kershaw also points out that fairness review shows up in the U.K. within the Aberdeen Railway line of cases.  It 
happens at the damages phase of cases where a fully or partly performed contract was ruled void.  The outcome of 
the judicial accounting depended on the fairness of the bargain.  Id. at 326.  
141 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
142 KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 327-28. 
143 Id. at 329-41. 
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Beveridge’s critics argued that Marsh’s primary historical point remains robust, for the 
history remains one of erosion—the more restrictive Aberdeen Railway line of authority wanes as 
less restrictive tandem of internal process and external fairness review waxes.144  This observation 
remains true, even in the wake of Kershaw’s intervention.  Evolutionary erosion is indeed 
fundamental to the history of American corporate fiduciary law.   
Kershaw successfully realigns the story’s normative implications.  Marsh’s 
oversimplification makes prohibition look natural and desirable for all concerned, other than the 
grasping managers themselves.  It also invites an explanation for the sudden shift to doctrinal 
flexibility grounded in interest group capture.  Under Kershaw’s account, prohibition is a false 
step made in a process of doctrinal transplantation.  For Kershaw, the baseline doctrinal 
dispensation builds in flexibility by allowing for the parties to process their way to beneficiary 
consent, subject a fairness backstop.  The experiment with prohibition took a rule formulated in a 
flexible, contractual context and redeployed it in an inflexible, mandatory context.  It was, as such, 
unsustainable, and its disappearance amounted to an ordinary course reversion to a doctrinal 
baseline.  Moreover, because prohibition had always co-existed with process and fairness review 
(some states going one way and others going the other way), there was no sharp break, just a quiet 
transition.  Kershaw reaches these conclusions as a strictly positive proposition.  No normative 
punchline is wrought into his analysis.   
 B. Berle on Self-Dealing Transactions 
The writings of Adolf Berle indirectly confirm Kershaw’s account.  The confirmation is 
unexpected, for the evolutionary erosion account is a conceptual first cousin to the description of 
separated ownership and control that originated with Berle’s writings of the early 1930s and went 
on to dominate thinking about corporations for rest of the 20th century.  Self-dealing transactions 
were a problem for observers like Marsh and Clark precisely because management possessed 
boardroom power without accountability.  They were reluctant to rely on judicial fairness review 
because they saw it as a part of a larger system devoted to management accommodation.  One 
accordingly would expect to see judicial treatment of management self-dealing transactions front 
 
144 See Velasco, supra note 104, at 1044. 
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and center in the extended discussions of fiduciary law in Berle’s work in law reviews145 and in 
Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property.146  But the opposite is true. 
Berle certainly recognized that the management accountability problem enhanced the 
importance of legal fiduciary constraint.    With growing separation, he wrote, legal enforcement 
of the constraint and the shareholder franchise were the only things left that assured shareholders 
of expected positive returns.  Take them away, and shareholders would be left entirely at the mercy 
of the manager’s good nature.147  Berle saw plenty of problems with the fiduciary regime.  But the 
duty of loyalty, as applied to self-dealing transactions, was not one of them.  To the contrary:  “The 
law governing the duties of management towards security owners is perhaps the only section of 
corporate jurisprudence which has not undergone a sustained weakening process.” 148   Berle 
acknowledged that there were two lines of authority on the books, Aberdeen Railway voidability 
and process plus fairness review.149  But he didn’t think that much rode on the choice between the 
two.  It was an area where the common law had a “flexible and realistic” quality and judges did a 
good job when applying the law, usually finding a solution when the facts demanded remedial 
action.150   
Berle did see problems stemming from zones of management discretion that had opened 
up as a result of statutory liberalization and charter-based modifications of statutory defaults.  He 
identified five areas of likely abuse: (1) the power to issue (and set the terms of) new shares of 
stock;151 (2) the power to declare or withhold dividends;152 (3) the power to buy stock in other 
 
145 Here A. A. Jr. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931), is the leading 
contribution. 
146 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan 
reissue 1933). 
147 Id. at 196-97. 
148 Id. at 197. 
149 Id. at 198-99, n 4. 
150 Id.at 197.  Berle was similarly content with the law of majority-to-minority fiduciary duties.  Id. at 212-213.  He 
only found fault with the treatment (or, better, nontreatment) of sale of control transactions.   It is true that The 
Modern Corporation warned about management “plundering,” but the warning is incident to a future projection.  It 
was thought experiment: Suppose the pattern of separation was extended further out to a logical conclusion point 
and corporate investors continued their pattern of acceding to any requested modification of the corporate charter 
that had the effect of according management more power.  The result would be a management power to divert 
corporate income to its own use.  What should we do then?  There two alternatives: either tamp on management by 
imposing trust duties even though there might be a countervailing cost, or give management free rein and accept the 
risk of plundering.  Id. at 311.  At the bottom line there were two points.  The hypothesized plundering should be 
controlled even as rights should be recognized in constituents other than the shareholders. Id. at 312. 
151 Berle, supra note 145, at 1052-1059. 
152 Id. at 1060-1063. 
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corporations and use ownership of blocks of stock to entrench management;153 (4) the power to 
amend the corporate charter by majority vote and thereby injure the interests of minority classes 
of stock;154 and (5) the power to transfer corporate assets and control in mergers.155  Surveying 
instances of abuse across the five topics, Berle made his famous suggestion that the exercise of 
corporate power should be subject to an equitable limitation of exercise for “the ratable benefit of 
all the shareholders as their interest appears.”156  All corporate actions should be “twice tested: 
first for technical compliance with the law pursuant to which corporate powers are created and 
then under the equitable standard.”157 
Today, only one of Berle’s five topics—mergers and acquisitions—arouses policy 
concerns regarding the shape and application of the duty of loyalty. The third topic, defensive 
cross-corporate block ownership, was dealt a death blow in the Delaware courts back in 1967.158  
In the other three areas—new stock issues, dividend policy, and equity recapitalizations—
management discretion still rules and the equitable concerns that motivated Berle motivate few 
decisions today.159  The fact patterns continue to lie largely in business judgement territory, with 
investors largely left to fend for themselves. 
C. Summary 
 Let us reconsider the fourth phase of erosion of fiduciary scrutiny in light of Kershaw’s 
historical counter-story.  The fourth phase now can be recast as a reversion to historical form.  In 
phases one and two, we had mandatory review by disinterested directors, backed by fairness 
scrutiny.  In phase four, we have a variation on that theme—a choice between review by 
independent directors and fairness scrutiny.  Phase three (fairness scrutiny across the board without 
process scrutiny) emerged as a break in the pattern, a break that paired with the phase one 
experiment with prohibition.  Deep skepticism about the quality of boardroom decision-making 
motivated both breaks.  Part IV will show that the skepticism is now on the wane. 
 
153 Id.at 1063-1065. 
154 Id. at 1066-1069. 
155 Id. at 1069-1073. 
156 Id. at 1049. 
157 Id.  
158 See Condec v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967)(finding a breach of duty in a keiretsu-type stock 
swap undertaken in defense of a hostile tender offer). 
159 The author is one of the few.  See William W. Bratton & Michael Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013). 
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IV. SELF-DEALING TRANSACTIONS IN TODAY’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM 
 This Part reconsiders the evolutionary erosion account’s present normative implications, 
reversing the conclusion that erosion is a problem.  The reversal follows from reference to 
developments in practice.  In its fourth phase, evolutionary erosion of fiduciary doctrine was 
accompanied by the evolutionary emergence of a governance system capable of making managers 
accountable and tilting the boardroom balance against self-dealing transactions.  It accordingly is 
not at all clear that the erosion implies significant shareholder injury.  Nor is it clear that public 
company shareholders continue to need as of right fairness scrutiny, much less per se prohibition, 
for the governance system now works well enough to let them take care of themselves.   Ironically, 
continued and constant aversion to self-dealing is the key motivation.  
 Section A briefly recounts the story, now familiar, of the shift of power from entrenched 
managers to independent boards and market shareholders.  The account takes us from the biased 
and enervated board observed by Marsh and Clark to the more vigorous, majority-independent 
monitoring board that we see today, and from the helpless shareholders of the era of separated 
ownership and control to today’s institutional masters of the corporate universe. 
 Section B turns to the present corporate governance environment, showing how regulation 
makes it an unfriendly place for self-dealing transactions.  There are two means to this end:  
mandatory disclosure and director independence standards that are undercut by a self-dealing on 
the side.  Norms operative within corporations are even stricter than the regulation—this Article’s 
survey of recent proxy statements shows near universal adherence to a norm favoring 
supermajority independent boards. 
 Section C adds detail to this practice picture, reviewing a sample of recent proxy statement 
disclosures of self-dealing transactions.  There is a plethora of transactions reported, almost all of 
them small and highly unlikely to excite shareholder concerns.  Only two big deals show up in the 
93 proxy statements in the group, both of which can be explained away institutionally as outliers.  
Concerns about slack devolve on a subset of controlled companies, which make up 10% of the 
sample. 
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 Section D enhances the picture of self-dealing transactions at controlled companies by 
reviewing the prospectus disclosures of 50 companies that completed initial public offerings 
(IPOs) during the fall of 2019.  Ninety-six percent of the companies in this sample are either 
controlled by founders and VCs (whether separately or jointly) or by a majority-holding operating 
parent.  Self-dealing contracts show more economic salience in this subset, even as there is also 
evidence that normative constraints in their disfavor register even here.  Blockholder self-dealing 
is wrought into issuer business plans only in the majority parent-subsidiary subset.   
 Section E turns to the litigation environment and a collection of 512 duty of loyalty 
litigations commenced in the Delaware Chancery court since 1985.  A survey of the reported 
complaints shows that the classic self-dealing transaction on which Marsh focused is no longer a 
salient litigation topic, at least from a policy point of view.  There are still plenty of cases featuring 
self-dealing but they tend to come up in the information enriched and heavily regulated context of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
 Part IV concludes that, given separation of ownership and control, regulatory constraints 
(disclosure and independence rules) work together with systemic normative constraints effectively 
to discourage self-dealing contracts.  Normative constraints appear to suffer dilution in controlled 
companies, and continued vigilance in monitoring remains advisable in the sector.  
A. The Emergence of the Independent Board and the Power Shift 
 When Marsh published in 1966, the concept of corporate governance did not yet exist.  It was 
invented soon thereafter—the term first appeared in the press in 1972.160  The first fully developed 
text on the subject, Melvin Eisenberg’s The Structure of the Corporation,161 followed in 1976. 
Eisenberg synthesized and advanced a generation of thinking about deficiencies of the received 
legal model of the corporation. 162  For a corrective mechanism, he turned to the board of 
directors,163 long thought to be moribund.  His theory was that, if we scaled down the demands we 
placed on it and successfully required it to monitor management performance (as opposed to taking 
 
160 See Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. Corp. L. 359, 373 (2016) (“[T]he New York 
Times featured the phrase as early as 1972.”). 
161  MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976). Eisenberg’s 
monitoring model of the board of directors has ever since been the main focus of legal corporate governance. 
162 See generally id. (discussing additional rules and structure for corporate governance). 
163 See id. at 139–85 (discussing additional structure for board of directors and management). 
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a leadership role in hands on management), corporate performance would improve. 164  This 
monitoring function in turn required independent directors and a committee structure keyed to 
monitoring functions. 165   Eisenberg’s monitoring model quickly came to the fore in policy 
discussions and retained its center stage position when, in succeeding years, the microeconomic 
concept of agency costs166 came into circulation as the diagnostic base for problems stemming 
from separated ownership and control.  Independent boards meant agency cost reduction and, 
hence, shareholder value enhancement.  
 The monitoring board of directors was still very much a work in progress when Dean Clark 
published in 1986.  Management had tried to capture the new thing called “corporate governance” 
in the late 1970s, attempting to mold it for its own purposes before some competing interest could 
do so in a more intrusive way.  Thus did Business Roundtable in 1978 publicly embrace the 
independent director majority.167 It figured that any threat to its members’ privileges was minimal 
so long as incumbent CEOs could use their influence to secure appointment of cooperative types 
in independent slots.168 Cooperative engagement by management did not last long, in any event.  
The 1978 concession was a preemptive strike launched in response to post-Watergate regulatory 
initiatives.  When the threat of new regulation receded after 1980, management reverted to its 
accustomed role of opposition to corporate governance reform.  It fought tooth and nail when the 
American Law Institute geared up to propose independence mandates in the 1980s.169  Meanwhile, 
the markets had suddenly shown up at governance’s front line—hostile tender offerors were using 
the free market in shares to throw managers out onto the street.  We can see now, with the benefit 
of hindsight, that the markets’ position in corporate governance has been steadily solidifying ever 
since. 170   But that outcome was far from clear in 1986, when most observers feared that 
 
164 See id. at 156–57 (discussing the function of the board of directors). 
165 See id. (emphasizing the monitoring function of the board). 
166 The source was Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
167 See Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned 
Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2085, 2089, 2093 (1978) (proposing reforms to encourage more independent 
directors). 
168 See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 610-
612 (1982) (describing the pattern of cooperation and management control of appointments). 
169See Victor Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 228 
(1983) (opposing increased government regulation of board structure). 
170 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 655, 676 (2010)(“[M]anagers emerged from the 1980s sensitized to the benefits of shareholder-value 
maximization even as the board of directors emerged as a more robust monitoring institution. Hostile takeovers 
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management could and would use its lawmaking influence to defuse the market threat.  When the 
takeovers really did stop, after 1989, it was indeed the ostensible result of collaboration between 
managers and state lawmakers to deter takeovers with legal barriers.171 
Management won the regulatory battle against takeovers only to lose the governance war 
in the long run.  The system adjusted to the reversal of the hostile takeover in significant respects, 
finding new ways to reduce management agency costs in a dynamic process operating both inside 
corporate hierarchies and outside in the market.172  Managers emerged from the takeover era 
sensitized to the benefits of shareholder value maximization. 173   The board of directors 
simultaneously emerged as a more robust monitoring institution.  Together, managers and boards 
used equity compensation plans to redirect management incentives in the shareholders’ 
direction. 174   There was also a steady stream of input regarding governance practices from 
shareholders, now capable of making their voices heard due to the trend toward holding by 
institutional investors.  Although precatory rather than directive, the inputs were not without 
effect,175 figuring into a general movement to use process to push companies away from CEO 
dominance to greater responsiveness to market demands.  Movement to a majority independent 
board was a focal point. 
What started as shareholder governance input evolved into governance dominance when 
activist hedge funds appeared after the turn of this century.  Their success at shaping business plans 
showed that the shareholder collective action problem is not as preclusive as had been assumed.  
Commentators had long bemoaned the absence of disciplining blockholders in the U.S. 
shareholder population.176   With the activist hedge funds, we finally developed a home-grown 
 
lost their place at the cutting edge of corporate governance as a result.”). 
171 See Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The United 
States and Europe, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1991) (“The desire by both management and state legislators to 
curb hostile takeovers placed the courts in a difficult dilemma.”). 
172 The groundwork has been there for all to see for many years. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 29,which describes 
the changes as adaptive and stresses that they have followed from bilateral cooperation between shareholders and 
managers. 
173 Bratton &Wachter, supra note 170, at 677-78. 
174 Id. at 678. 
175 Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 
111 (2016)( suggesting that passive mutual funds influence firms' governance choices, resulting in more 
independent directors, removal of takeover defenses, and more equal voting rights). 
176 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE 223-24 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: 
The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1006-09 (1993).  It turned out 
that the incentives that supported blockholding abroad could not be replicated domestically.  Path dependencies 
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variant.  The hedge funds tell managers how to realise value and challenge publicly those who 
resist the advice, successfully using the proxy contest as a threat.177  The threat has proved credible: 
hedge fund designees have entered boardrooms in large numbers, all without any change in the 
legal model.  The difference lies in the economics of their shareholding and has to do with 
institutional incentive alignment.178  The hedge fund strategy has proved successful overall179 and 
appears to be a permanent force in corporate governance.   
Power has shifted to the shareholders as a result.  The market (that is, dispersed investors) 
now often determines production decisions.  The system channels shareholder inputs into business 
decision-making through the electoral franchise—managers must attend to shareholder demands 
because activist investors can credibly threaten to intervene directly in target firm governance by 
gaining board representation through a proxy contest.180   The process of threat and response is 
dynamic—rational managers accede to activist demands concerning the business plan or modify 
their business plans in anticipation of such demands.  Meanwhile, the appearance of the hedge 
funds triggers other changes in the system.  Managers, now on the defensive, voluntarily remove 
longstanding process barriers to shareholder inputs as they cater to the shareholder side.  Even 
mainstream investment advisors,181 formerly thought to be allergic to governance intervention, 
now take a more aggressive posture.   
 
within the system retarded its adaptability.  At the same time, blockholding in other countries followed from their 
different political environments, in particular their stronger social democratic systems. 
177 The hedge funds take significant equity stakes in target companies—5 to 15 percent of the stock is the range—
and demand new value realization in the near or intermediate term. They pursue the financial items that sit at the top 
of the standard agency cost reduction agenda—increased leverage, payouts of excess cash, premium asset sales, and 
cost cutting.    William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L. J. 1375, 1390-1401 (2007).   
178 Id. at 1384. Hedge funds are independent actors, where other institutional investors are not.  They do not sell 
services to the class of companies they target, and so, unlike conventional mutual fund advisors, are unconflicted.  
Id. at 1384.  But they depend on, and have received, the support of other, more passive institutional investors.  See 
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation 
of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865-67 (2013).   
179 See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 
1739-45 (2008). 
180 For empirical studies of incidence, tactics, and success, see Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall 
Thomas., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008); April Klein 
& Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 
188 (2009); Nikolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 
J. FIN. ECON. 610 (2013). 
181 See William W. Bratton & Simone Sepe, Corporate Law and The Myth of Efficient Market Control, 105 Cornell 
L. Rev. 675, 726 (2020). 
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As with the earlier emergence of independent boards, the power shift occurred at the level 
of practice rather than as a function of regulatory mandate.  The move to independence resulted 
from joint efforts by directors and investors to institute best corporate practices.182  Mandates 
concerning board composition did come in the form of stock exchange rules mandating a majority 
independent board and independent committees,183 but they came after the fact, in the wake of the 
Enron debacle of 2001.  Hedge fund activism emerged as a function of the evolution of a lightly 
regulated form of investment management, a form that produced fund managers with incentives 
suited to pursue governance intervention as an investment strategy. 
This does not go to say that regulatory innovations have been irrelevant.  The 1994 
amendment of the proxy rules to permit short candidate slates184 laid advance groundwork for the 
activists.  The 2003 imposition on investment advisors of a duty to vote portfolio shares on a 
considered basis and in the beneficiary’s best interests185 similarly eased their way by depriving 
management of a built-in base of voting support.  The voting rule also prompted the appearance 
of powerful informational intermediaries like ISS and Glass Lewis, who met a sudden demand for 
voting advice emanating from smaller advisors for whom internal decision-making on voting was 
not cost effective. 
 
B. Self-Dealing Transactions: Disclosure Mandates and Inconvenient Consequences 
 We turn to the place taken by the classic self-dealing transaction in today’s shareholder-
oriented governance system.  
 Assume that today’s shareholders are as allergic to self-dealing transactions as were 
Professor Marsh and Dean Clark—that they similarly weigh the costs and benefits and reach the 
same negative result.  Given that assumption, is it plausible to suggest that self-dealing transactions 
 
182 The emergence of the independent board did occasion some pushing and shoving in the private sector, manifested 
in the gestation of the ALI corporate governance project.  See Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the 
American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1993) (describing the conflicting views between the 
ALI and corporate management). 
183 N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Listed Company Manual, 303A.01 (2020),   
https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/listed-company-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-
PHC-%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-66 (last visited Dec. 
16, 2020).  Not only is an independent director majority now mandated, but independence is defined formally.  Id. ¶ 
303A.02.  Accompanying mandates include separate meetings for outside directors, and all independent nominating, 
compensation, and audit committees.  Id. ¶¶ 303A.03, .303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.06 (2019). 
184 See SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-4(d)(4), 17 CFR § 229. 14a-4(d)(4)(2019). 
185 See SEC, Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 17 CFR Part 275, Release No. IA-2106 (March 10, 2003). 
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could amount to a systemic problem in public companies with dispersed shareholders?  It is 
difficult to imagine how the problem could persist.  If self-dealing transactions rub shareholders 
the wrong way, then one would expect them to go the same way as staggered boards and plurality 
voting, with management voluntarily taking them off the table as management caters to 
institutional investors and informational intermediaries.  Indeed, it is an easy accommodation for 
managers to make.  When Marsh published back in 1966, managers took most of their 
remuneration in the form of salary, a salary set on a grid that tied theirs to that of the rest of the 
employees.186  In that context, a self-dealing transaction, much like insider trading, would have 
served as an indirect means of getting a raise.  The shift to equity-based compensation removes 
the need for this subterfuge.   The governance system, meanwhile, builds in two significant 
disincentives—transactional disclosure and loss of independent status.   
 Today’s self-dealing transactions are effected in plain view, at least so long as a reporting 
company wants to stay in compliance with federal law.  The annual proxy statement is required to 
disclose, pursuant to Regulation S-K item 404, transactions in an amount exceeding $120,000 
between the company and, inter alia, board members, executive officers, and members of their 
immediate families.187  The company also has to disclose its “policies and procedures for the 
review, approval, or ratification of any transaction required to be reported.”188  The regulation 
suggests that the transactions covered, the standards to be applied, and the very existence of a 
written policy all might be matters material to the annual report.189   
 When a self-dealing transaction involves a director, the director loses independent status.  
The New York Stock Exchange here applies the same $120,000 test as does Regulation S-K and 
goes on to pick up interlocks between the company and entities connected to the director and his 
or her immediate family members, defined in terms of payments within three years in an amount 
exceeding the greater of $1 million or 2 percent of the interlocked entity’s gross revenues.190  The 
NASDAQ Rule proceeds similarly, raising the interlock test to $200,000 and 5 percent.191  Under 
both sets of rules, loss of independent status means that the director no longer qualifies for the 
 
186 See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 
131-34 (2016). 
187 SEC, Regulation S-K, item 404, 17 CFR § 229.404(a)(1) - (Item 404) (2019) (transactions with related persons, 
promoters and certain control persons). 
188 Id. § 229.404(b)(1). 
189 Id. 
190 NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 183, ¶ 303A.02(b)(ii), (b)(v). 
191 NASDAQ, Rulebook - The Nasdaq Stock Market, Rule 5605(a)(2) (2009). 
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majority minimum and may not serve on any of the audit, compensation, or nominating 
committees.192  Non-independent status can also have a negative knock-on effect—a loss of votes 
for management’s slate at the annual meeting.  The proxy advisory services, ISS and Glass Lewis, 
articulate their own independence standards and represent that they do their own independence 
checks. 193  They also up the ante on the stock exchange rules—ISS lowers the transactional 
threshold to $10,000; Glass Lewis wants a two-thirds independent board.  Neither advisor 
articulates separate rules defining and prohibiting self-dealing transactions, instead dealing with 
the matter within the framework of the independence determination. 
 How much of a deterrent to self-dealing results?  Loss of independent status is a big deal, 
for the prevailing best-practice norm pushes companies to be well above a one-half or two-thirds 
majority.  Data collected in connection with this Article194 comes from the most recent proxy 
statements from the 31 companies in the Dow Industrial Average, 31 companies in the S&P midcap 
400195 and 31 companies in the S&P small cap 600.196  All of the Dow companies, all but one of 
the midcap companies, and all but four of the small cap companies reported super-majority 
independent boards.  More particularly, the companies have an all independent board but for either 
one seat (held by the CEO) or two seats (held by the CEO and chief operating officer).  The single 
exception in the midcap group, with a bare independent majority, is a real estate development 
company that operates in a single state and makes close relationships with local financial interests, 
including transactional ties and board interlocks, an upfront part of its business plan.  In the 
smallcap group, three of the four exceptions have two-thirds majority independent boards.  The 
one outlier is a controlled company—a company with a dual-class common capital structure and 
a founder and his family holding 65 percent of the voting power and occupying one-half of six 
board seats.  (The company takes advantage of a NASDAQ exception to the majority independence 
rule for a defined class of controlled companies.197) 
 
192 NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 183, ¶¶ 303A.05, 303A.06, and 303A.07; NASDAQ Rule 5605(c), 
(d), and (e) (2009). 
193 ISS, U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 9-10,https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/.../US-Voting-
Guidelines.pdf; GLASS LEWIS, POLICY GUIDELINES 5, 7, https://www.glasslewis.com/guidelines/. 
194 The spreadsheets are available on request addressed to this Article’s author. The exercise is inspired by a survey 
of the Dow companies conducted by Beveridge.  See Beveridge, supra note 105, at 13.  Beveridge concluded that 
self-dealing transactions retained economic salience.   The spreadsheets are available on request addressed to the 
author. 
195 This sample included the ten largest companies in the index and 20 arbitrarily selected companies. 
196 This sample was arbitrarily selected. 
197 NASDAQ, Rulebook - The Nasdaq Stock Market, Rule IM 5615-5 (Mar. 12, 2009). 
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 Given the supermajority norm, there is no room for large self-dealing transactions between 
nonexecutive directors and their companies.  Now that all nonexecutive directors must be 
independent, a significant self-dealing transaction is intrinsically disqualifying.  This barrier does 
not obtain as regards the top officers, as to whom independence is not a possibility.  But, as the 
next section shows, normative constraints also come to bear on non-independent executives.  
C. Transactions 
 To get a better sense of the practice, consider the disclosures of self-dealing transactions in 
the 93 proxy statements.  Separation of ownership and control is the norm across the sample—
almost 90% of the companies lack a controlling blockholder198 or parent, with their officers and 
directors as a group almost always owning less than 2% of the stock.199 Although blockholders 
with stakes above 5% are ubiquitous, the overwhelming majority are passive asset managers like 
Blackrock and Vanguard.  The sample contains ten controlled exceptions to the rule of separated 
ownership and control.  Of these, two are Dow companies (Walmart, where the founder’s family 
retains a majority, and WalgreensBoots, where the CEO holds a 15.3% block), two are midcap 
companies (with family blocks of 47% and 22%), and six come from the smallcap sample (three 
companies with dual class capital structures and founder control, and three companies with large 
CEO blocks of 46%, 32% and 20%, respectively).   
 All but one of the companies in the sample200 report internal procedures that draw on the 
SEC’s disclosure regulations and the exchanges’ independence standards to define self-dealing 
transactions.  The company policies refer any proposed transaction falling into the definition to 
either to an independent corporate governance committee, to the audit committee, or to the full 
board for a determination as to whether the transaction is in the company’s best interests or, 
alternatively, to review the transaction’s compliance with elaborate guidelines.  A handful of 
companies report more informal modes of treatment—for example, reference to general 
counsel.201  
 We now turn to the companies’ reports of particular transactions.  The modal report, made 
by 37% of the companies, was that there were no reportable transactions.  This response is twice 
 
198 See supra note 7 for the parameters used in identifying a controlling blocker.   
199 There is one exception to this rule in the Dow sample (Nike at 10%); there are five exceptions in the midcap 
sample where there is no controlling blockholder and the officers and directors own more than 5%, and four 
exceptions in the small cap sample. 
200 The single exception is in apparent violation of the proxy rules. 
201 For a more thorough-going report on this corner of governance practice, see Tuch, supra note 6, at 995. 
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as likely in the mid- and smallcap sectors.  The most common transaction reported is nepotistic 
hiring—a child, in-law, spouse, or sibling of a director or officer working at the company and 
earning more than $120,000.  This is more likely to happen at bigcap companies, 52% of which 
reported such arrangements.  The practice is not pretty to look at, but hardly a shareholder concern, 
because the jobs are not at the top, and the reported compensation figures are not large.202  A  
 
Figure 1.  Self-Dealing Transactions at Listed Companies 
 
number of the additional categories of reported transactions are manifestly benign: 14% of the 
companies entered into ordinary course transactions in commodified goods with directors and 
interlocked partners (including bank loans); a number of companies retained contractual ties with 
spun-out companies; and institutional blockholders, Vanguard and Blackrock principally provided 
services to a number of companies. There also were three corporate jet expense-sharing 
arrangements. These would earn a negative voting recommendation from Glass Lewis,203 but are 
unlikely to excite the particular companies’ shareholders, for once again, the numbers are not large. 
 
202 The author’s sense is that nepotistic hiring is statistically less likely to occur at Dow companies than it is to occur 
in hiring of law school faculty and administration. 
203 See Glass Lewis, supra note 187, at 20. 
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 A handful of transactions were large enough to require a closer look, using $1 million as a 
materiality threshold.204  These include six cases of noncommodified transactions with interlocked 
companies.  Goldman Sachs reported one such relationship, but it amounted to less than 0.01% of 
the revenues of the counterparty.  JPMorgan Chase reported a $32 million real estate 
redevelopment project with a company in which a director (who was not participating in the 
transaction) indirectly held a 10% interest.  There were three interlocked transactions in the midcap 
group, but none of them amounted to 2% of the reporting company’s revenues. 
 There were five cases of contracts over $1 million with a control party or large blockholder 
also serving as a top executive. One of these was at a Dow company, WalgreensBoots, which owns 
9% of an Italian pharmacy chain controlled by Stefano Pessina, who also serves as 
WalgreensBoots’s CEO and reports ownership of 15.4% of its stock.  Here, finally, we have a 
classic, suspicious self-dealing situation at a large company.  Even so, these arrangements did not 
originate in our governance system—they came into the Dow group from another national 
governance system by means of a series of cross-border acquisitions. The second of the five cases 
is in the midcap group and amounts to only 0.15% of the reporting company’s annual revenues.  
As to the three in the smallcap group, one is barely over this Article’s $1 million materiality 
threshold.  The second is a lease amounting to 0.5% of the reporting company’s revenues. Only 
the third transaction implicates numbers which by themselves might give pause.  But it turns out 
not to be suspicious in the particular circumstances, for the company is a captive REIT whose 
business model is grounded in the purchase of properties from a controlling real estate 
development firm.   
 How much of a problem do the self-dealing transactions, reported by the companies in this 
dataset, present?  With the exception of WalgreensBoots and the captive REIT, we are talking 
about a small number of small-numbers transactions.  Significantly, the few red flags that do go 
up in the sample do so at controlled or heavily influenced companies.  Given separated ownership 
and control, self-dealing transactions have, for all intents and purposes disappeared, other than for 
the hiring of relatives at big companies and the purchase of services from Vanguard and Blackrock.  
 
204 The $1 million tripwire is arbitrary and chosen by the author rather than derived from applicable regulations.  
There were reported transactions between two CEOs and their companies, but both were considerably less than $1 
million in amount. 
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Meanwhile, one assumes that the CEOs look to their compensation plans as the source of internal 
value extraction.   
 Let us return to the starting point and draw an inference from the fact pattern: a norm 
against self-dealing transactions now comes to bear internally.  It stems from the same judgment 
that motivated Marsh and Clark: self-dealing transactions are not cost beneficial from the point of 
view of equity investors.  The norm is closely conceptually related to the norm that favors 
supermajority independent boards.  Both norms, although buttressed by regulation in the form of 
disclosure rules and independence mandates, appear to carry considerable force of their own.  
D.  Caveat: Control Parties 
 A notable tie connects the red-flag transactions in the proxy statements and the 10% 
minority of controlled companies in the sample.  The tie is intuitive—control and self-dealing have 
deep (and historic) ties.  The point was brought home yet again in the press in the fall of 2019, 
when the financial community focused on the preliminary prospectus of a high-flying startup, We 
Co., the parent of WeWork.  Attention focused most keenly on the sale of the putative trademark 
in “we” to WeWork for $5.9 million by We Holdings LLC, an alter ego of We’s founder and 30% 
owner, Adam Neumann.205  The transaction shocked observers as much for the brazenness of the 
intellectual property grab as for the corruption implicit in the $5.9 million consideration.  It was 
by no means the only self-dealing arrangement detailed in the SEC filing.  Neumann bought 
properties for his own account and simultaneously leased them to WeWork, all while borrowing 
money from WeWork at low interest rates.  There was nepotism as well.  WeWork hired 
Neumann’s spouse (as chief brand and impact officer), his brother-in-law who was a soccer player 
(as “wellness” officer), and another family member (in connection with the annual “Creator 
Awards,” a live pitch competition with celebrity judges).206  The negative inspection prompted by 
Neumann’s self-dealing quickly spread to WeWork’s business model.  The dominoes fell in the 
wake of the scrutiny—the public offering was scrapped, and Neumann was terminated as CEO.  
 
205 Ellen Huet, WeWork Gave Founder Loans as It Paid Him Rent, IPO Filing Shows, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-14/wework-gave-founder-loans-as-it-paid-him-rent-ipo-filing-
shows. 
206 Id. 
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The company went on life support207 even before the Covid-19 crisis deflated the demand for its 
product.  In the long run there may not be much “there” there at WeWork. 
 The WeWork story by itself forecloses any possibility that this Article could close with a 
generalization to the effect that “self-dealing transactions are no longer a problem.”  The spectacle 
of pervasive self-dealing corroding a big-ticket enterprise gestated with venture capital (VC) raises 
fundamental questions about the governance system—this is, after all, a context supposedly 
characterized by high-intensity monitoring and disciplinary intervention by blockholding 
shareholders.  But the WeWork crack-up also has a brighter side—it seems that the pre-IPO 
inspection process is sensitive to governance defects and insistent as regards their repair.  It is also 
allergic to some self-dealing transactions.   
 For present purposes, the question is whether WeWork was typical of today’s IPO 
companies or was an outlier.  To answer this question, prospectuses filed in connection with the 
IPOs of 50 domestic companies successfully completed between June and December 2019 have 
been reviewed.  Based on this sample, there is a clear answer respecting WeWork: it was indeed 
an outlier.  The takeaway concerning self-dealing more generally is mixed.  Startups go public as 
controlled companies and, as such, are burdened by self-dealing transactions absent in the case of 
seasoned issuers with dispersed shareholders.  At the same time, there is evidence that norms 
favoring independence and discouraging self-dealing have an effect even at controlled startups. 
 Seventy-six percent of the companies went public with the founder, the VCs, or the founder 
and the VCs together holding more than 50% of the voting stock.  In another 6% of the IPOs, the 
founder and VCs controlled between 20% and 50% of the stock.  In addition, 10% percent of the 
companies came out of a controlling parent (whether by secondary offering or by spinoff).  The 
remaining 8% of the IPOs took various profiles—one was a secondary offering by a controlling 
family; there was a captive REIT; and there was an IPO by a private equity investee.  In only two 
cases out of 50 did the company emerge from the IPO with separated ownership and control.    
 Most of the VC IPOs, which made up 82% of the sample of 50, went public without 
reporting significant self-dealing transactions between the company and their founders, VCs, and 
 
207 Carrie Monahan & Sheila Dang, WeWork Still on Life Support, Rivals Say It Must Cut Costs Fast, REUTERS 
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wework-survival-analysis/wework-still-on-life-support-rivals-
say-it-must-cut-costs-fast-idUSKBN1XF2GM. 
 
57 
 
other officers and directors (other than those always incident to VC financing structures).  More 
particularly, 46% of the VC IPOs had no transactions to report, while an additional 17% reported 
significant contracts that had been either terminated or were otherwise wound down in advance of 
the offering.  At the same time, 37% of the VC companies went public with self-dealing 
transactions in place—sales, leases or sharing arrangements of real property and intellectual 
property, company borrowings, and paid advisory relationships.   None of the ties, however, rose 
to WeWork proportions or otherwise appeared as fundamental to the business model.  The story 
was different at the controlled subsidiaries, where contractual ties to the parents remained 
extensive and tight.  Across the entire sample, nepotism was reported at only three companies.  
Finally, the supermajority board independence norm holds amongst the VC startups, despite the 
pervasiveness of blockholding.  Things work differently in the controlled subsidiaries, where most 
of the issuers take advantage of NASDAQ’s controlled company exception to the majority 
independence rule.208   
 The IPO companies, viewed overall, offer a mixed picture of self-dealing at controlled 
companies.  There is evidence that the governance norm disfavoring self-dealing does indeed 
affect these companies—the tendency to unwind internal contractual ties before the offering 
testifies to this.  But the inference also arises that the norm’s intensity diminishes in controlled 
environments, losing the reliable aspect it now carries given dispersed shareholding.  No regulatory 
emergency is indicated, even as these situations continue to call for scrupulous monitoring. 
E. Litigation  
 As a final check on our working hypothesis concerning self-dealing transactions—that they 
no longer present a salient drag on shareholder value at public companies where ownership and 
control are separated—a survey of Delaware fiduciary litigation was conducted.  The dataset 
contains every case that led to an opinion posted in Westlaw’s Delaware Chancery Court folder 
that contained the phrase “duty of loyalty.”  The opinions brought up by the search term were 
culled into a subset of cases containing allegations of breach of the duty of loyalty.  Where, as 
 
208 All but two of the companies followed the CEO only or CEO plus one practice.    
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often happens, a litigation leads to more than one opinion, the first opinion is the one in the dataset.  
The dataset begins in 1985209 and ends on June 30, 2019.  It sweeps in 512 separate litigations.210  
 A survey of the cases shows that in Delaware today, claims made based on the duty of 
loyalty tend to concern mergers and acquisitions.  These comprise 46.1% of the reported 
litigations.  Within that group, 81.7% concern sell-side shareholder claims.  Only 16 of the merger 
cases concerned hostile tender offers, and only one of that group occurred in this century.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Subject Matter of Delaware Duty of Loyalty Litigation, 1985-2019 
 
 
 
209 The folder contains only three cases decided before 1985. 
210 Some lines were drawn.  Claims for officer and director indemnification are not included; actions seeking access 
to books and records to verify a suspected breach of the duty of loyalty are included. 
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The salience of merger litigation is unsurprising.  For present purposes, its importance lies in the 
light that it sheds on Marsh and Clark’s policy initiative.  The law of M&A, like the law of 
executive compensation (which is the second largest subject matter group, at 11.7%) is not a 
territory conducive to policing by prohibition.   Given a merger, a sell-side shareholder premium 
is on the table even when the merger involves self-dealing by sell-side actors, so the costs and 
benefits favor considering the deal despite the taint.  Dangers due to self-dealing are dealt with 
through internal process protections—special negotiating committees and shareholder votes under 
mandatory disclosure—with judicial scrutiny as a backup.  Empirical studies of litigation volume 
suggest that self-dealing in the fact pattern can be expected to trigger a challenge in court.211 
 The cases were sorted to put M&A cases on one side of a line and all other cases on the 
other.  On the non-acquisition side, there were 47 cases (9.2% of the total dataset) concerning 
classic self-dealing transactions that would fall within the scope of section 144.  Of these, 13 
(27.7% of the group) involved publicly-traded companies without a control party, 25 (52.2%) 
involved a controlled or subsidiary company and nine (19.1%) involved a startup or close 
corporation.  There were also 41 cases (8%) that concerned corporate opportunities, use of 
corporate assets, or competition.  (Twelve of these cases also fall into the self-dealing transaction 
subset.)  Eleven of these cases followed the classic fact pattern on which the director or officer 
snatches a deal from the company.  But most cases in this category concerned insider trading (13 
cases) or competition with the company (13 cases). 
 At the bottom line, we find that only 13 of 512 litigations concerned independent public-
company self-dealing transactions outside of the M&A context, which is not a lot even assuming 
that an easier pleading standard regarding demand excusal would have resulted in a larger flow of 
complaints.  The point is not that self-dealing transactions no longer matter or that their importance 
is only conceptual.  Nor is the point that across-the-board independence solves all governance 
problems. The point is that, one way or the other, the corporate governance system has taken the 
self-dealing contract off the list of serious problems, at least where ownership and control are 
separate.   
 
211 See. e.g., Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Shifting Tides of 
Merger Litigation, 73 VAND. L. REV. 603, 604 (2018)(“In recent years, over 96% of publicly announced mergers 
have attracted a shareholder lawsuit, with many mergers attracting suits in multiple jurisdictions.”). 
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 This is not a surprising observation, given the general agreement that independent boards 
reduce agency costs.212  Costs related to self-dealing transactions follow naturally as one of the 
agency costs thus reduced.  This may or may not be a function of pervasive “independence” taken 
by itself; it could just as easily follow from changes in prevailing norms.  Either way, the self-
regulatory governance system has accomplished what Marsh and Clark thought only could be done 
with a federal law mandate.     
V. ERODED CASELAW RECONSIDERED  
 This Part draws on this Article’s regulatory and institutional account of today’s governance 
system to take a second look at the fourth phase of doctrinal erosion.  Fiduciary law (and the 
erosion thereof) cannot be evaluated in isolation, for the law is only one of a number of factors 
that come to bear in the regulation and control of management conduct.  Boardroom processes 
have evolved too, and in a good direction.  It is no longer plausible to dismiss them wholesale with 
a reference to structural bias.  If, as this Article contends, the corporate governance system is now 
worthy of the benefit of the doubt as regards its treatment of self-dealing transactions, then the 
phase four caselaw admits of a positive gloss.  This Part applies the polish, taking a second look 
at recent developments in Delaware law.  It starts with classic self-dealing transactions and goes 
on to cases on executive compensation and controlling shareholder duties, showing that changes 
in the governance environment have prompted a compensating rebalancing in the caselaw, as the 
Delaware courts fine tune their policing.   
A. Self-Dealing Transactions 
 The evolutionary erosion account makes a number of assumptions about boardroom 
processes, in particular the problem of structural bias.  Let us revisit the topic.  Professor Davis 
has demonstrated that structural bias is not a unitary behavioral condition. It is instead a collection 
 
212 It does enhance the value of the firm if (1) it succeeds at agency cost reduction and (2) all other things are equal 
and agency cost reduction entails no countervailing costs.  These are demanding assumptions.  For the argument that 
there are significant countervailing costs, see Bratton & Sepe, supra note 181.  Significantly, the results of empirical 
tests do not confirm systemic value enhancement.   Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship 
Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 923-933 (1999); Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005).  For 
further discussion, see Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 461-63 (2008). 
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of attributes. 213 The salience of some of these attributes has diminished with the rise of the 
independent board.  CEOs no longer control the member nomination process, and, as we have 
seen, non-management directors no longer tend to have significant business relationships with the 
company.  Collegiality, cooperation, and mutual sympathy doubtless are still important.  But one 
wonders whether today those factors could work as much against self-dealing transactions as in 
their favor:  today’s model colleague would never dream of putting fellow directors in the awkward 
position traversing best practice to approve a suspect transaction.   
 We emerge with continued reasons for vigilance, ever ready to question the quality of a 
boardroom decision to approve an inside deal.  But there has also been a change, for there is now 
an active possibility that such a decision is capable of passing inspection, despite residual traces 
of bias.  Indeed, a process has emerged for application in just such a case—the independent special 
committee, backed by its own counsel and banker and the power to say no.   
 Return now to the historical erosion of the duty of loyalty.  For Marsh and Clark, the move 
from prohibition to fairness scrutiny entailed a substantial value sacrifice, a sacrifice presumably 
materially magnified in the wake of the fourth phase’s installation of business judgment as the 
standard of review in many cases.  This Article’s survey of the operation of today’s governance 
system suggests the contrary.  The self-regulating system now builds in enforcement of the same 
norm that motivated Marsh and Clark.  It follows that the move away from as of right fairness 
scrutiny is defensible, if only as a judicial docket control adjustment. 
 Two additional developments counterbalance the historical trend toward a diminished 
fiduciary backstop.  The first is the emergence of the Delaware judiciary as the leading articulator 
of corporate fiduciary law and its pursuit of a standards-based jurisprudence in which all 
management conduct is potentially vulnerable to scrutiny.  Recent Delaware opinions routinely 
reference Berle’s “twice testing” rubric, by way of saying that there are no completely safe harbors 
navigable by adherence to form. 214   Indeed, policing remains active even as barriers to 
 
213 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr. Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of Director 
Independence, 90 IOWA L.REV. 1305, 1308-1309 (2005). 
214 See, e.g., In re Investors Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 177 A.3d 1208, 1222 (Del. 2017); Brown v. 
Kellar, 2018 WL 6721263 at 7 n. 52 (Del. Ch.).  See also Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of 
Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 29 (2015)(“[L] legal doctrine and case law precedent likely do 
less to tie the hands of the Delaware judiciary dealing with corporate oriented litigation than is the judicial norm. 
Given that corporate law cases brought in Delaware are often characterized by a high degree of fact specificity and 
given that many such cases will be governed by broadly cast fiduciary duty principles, Delaware judges often have 
as a practical matter substantial scope to be innovative.”) 
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representative litigation continue to rise.  Yes, the threshold question in today’s fiduciary litigation 
is the process inquiry into board independence rather than the substantive inquiry into transactional 
fairness.  But the transactional facts still get put on the table.  Once there for inspection, they can 
influence the application of the open-ended independence standard.  The standard, in turn, is being 
applied with increasing strictness.215 
 The second development is the shift of power in the shareholders’ direction, a shift effected 
through the use (or threatened use) of the shareholder franchise.  This takes us from the world that 
Berle described, where shareholders utterly depend on management good will and a backstop of 
legal protection, to a world where the management and shareholder interests bargain over the terms 
of the business plan and distributional outcomes.  Seen against this background, Delaware’s 
signature movement to business judgment review of sell-side mergers based on fully informed, 
majority disinterested shareholder ratification216 is more fairly characterized as adjustment than as 
erosion.   
 The adjustment even complements the Marsh-Clark policy analysis.  Marsh and Clark 
wanted prohibition because ex post judicial fairness review fails to assure that inside deals replicate 
arm’s length bargains.   Prohibition is now off the policy table.  That being the case, searching 
process scrutiny emerges in place of substantive fairness as the logical focus of judicial effort, for 
it is better force the actors to get as close as possible to arm’s length ex ante than for reviewing 
judges to take inputs on fair pricing from hired experts ex post. 
B. Executive Compensation 
 None of the foregoing cleanses the system of management cupidity—after all, they now 
just take it out as compensation.  Indeed, executive compensation has always been the weakest 
link in the chain of transactions subject to fiduciary scrutiny.  This is intrinsic: managers must be 
paid, so this particular mode of self-dealing must be tolerated.  The standard of review is business 
judgment, and the plaintiff has to show waste,217 which is hard to do, given the judiciary’s historic 
 
215 The classic, much criticized case Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 
980 (Del. Ch. 2003), held that a close long-term friendship and independence were compatible.  The recent case of 
Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.2d 124, 129 (Del. 2016), finds that co-ownership of a private plane is incompatible with 
independence. 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 129-30. 
217 The more particular formulation is that the amount of compensation must bear a “reasonable relationship” to the 
value of the services performed.  See CLARK, supra note 24, §6.01 at 192. 
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unwillingness to set compensation caps by reference to comparable companies.218  The sixty 
compensation cases in this Article’s Delaware database accordingly do not feature claims based 
on excessive amounts.  They are instead grounded in failure to adhere to the terms of complex 
compensation schemes, in manipulation of the timing of equity grants, and in failure to make 
adequate disclosures in the annual proxy statement.219   
 Academic discussion of executive pay is very much in accord with the foregoing.  It does 
not focus on fiduciary duty for, if there are structural problems, no one expects fiduciary law to 
solve them.  Unsurprisingly, there is a standing diagnosis of structural infirmity.  Under this 
diagnosis, management possesses and uses its excessive power to manipulate the system into 
compensating it excessively.  The turn to equity compensation schemes does not ameliorate the 
problem, even as the schemes are touted for aligning management incentives in the shareholder 
interest.  The schemes are seen as slackly designed, holding out rewards even when the manager 
beneficiaries have added no value.220  But there is also a counter-diagnosis.  This expands on the 
traditional justification for fiduciary law’s light touch in the area:221 market competition operates 
to contain management’s manipulative instincts; disclosure mandates and shareholder ratification 
requirements work together to get details to the shareholders and the market.222  With the waxing 
of shareholder power, the market control story becomes ever more credible,223 even as incidents 
of excess certainly continue to pop up on the screen.    
 
218 Id. at 193 (“If the average pay of top executives of apparently comparable companies is itself a tainted and 
suspect figure, with what is a given top executive’s pay to be compared, for the purpose of assessing fairness?”). 
219 See, e.g., Howland v. Kumar, 2019 WL 2479738 (Del. Ch.)(successfully alleging timing manipulation and 
applying the intrinsic fairness standard of review); In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 2018 WL 3545046  (Del. 
Ch.)(getting past motion to dismiss on a claim of misleading proxy disclosures); Wilkinson v. A. Schulman, Inc., 
2017 WL 5289553 (Del.Ch.)(seeking access to books and records to sustain a claim the directors issued a greater 
number of shares than contemplated by plan).  
 There has also been a recent tightening in the standard of review applied in the special case of the board’s 
arrangements to compensate itself.  When a plaintiff challenges such an arrangement, business judgment review 
only follows where stockholders approve a compensation plan that does not involve future director discretion in 
setting the amount of self-payment.  See In re Inv'rs Bancorp, Inc. S'holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2017); Stein 
v. Blankfein, 2019 WL 2323790 (Del.Ch.). 
220 See LUCIEN BEBCHUK, & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION (2004); GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991). 
221 See Clark, supra note 22, § 6.1, at 192-93. 
222 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 
713 (1995). 
223Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, CEO Pay Redux, 96 TEX. L.REV. 205 (2017)(providing 
empirical confirmation of the operation of market controls). 
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C.  Control and Influence  
 This Article’s review of a database of proxy disclosures undercovers one topic of 
concern—self-dealing transactions between controlled companies and their controllers.  
Historically, control has triggered fairness scrutiny.  But, as we have seen, a process door to 
business judgment review has opened here, too, based on approval by an empowered independent 
negotiating committee and disinterested shareholder ratification.224  It is too early to tell whether 
the governance system’s newfound strength is equal to this protective task, even as there is reason 
for optimism.   
 A countervailing adjustment in the caselaw should be highlighted.  Given a classic self-
dealing transaction in a company without a controlling shareholder, the standard of review follows 
from a determination as to whether a majority independent board gave its approval, with the 
Delaware courts showing increasing sensitivity to facts signalling that a director is subject to 
influence. 225   In contrast, a showing of shareholder control trumps the inquiry into board 
independence, for it amounts to a showing that the board is not independent.  The court proceeds 
directly to fairness scrutiny (subject to the ministration of a corrective process based on an 
independent committee and shareholder ratification).  An outright voting majority block tends to 
lead to a quick finding of shareholder control.  A case where a shareholder has a large but less-
than-majority block and a strong inside presence presents more problems for a plaintiff, but control 
can be shown on the facts. 
 Let us take a recent example, In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litigation.226  Elon 
Musk, the company’s chairman, CEO, and 22% blockholder, persuaded its board to make a large 
acquisition: a $26 billion stock-for-stock merger at a hefty premium with a company called 
SolarCity.227  Such a deal, even one into a different line of business, might not raise hackles.  But 
in this case, Musk owned 22% of the target’s stock.228 Moreover, the target was in the midst of a 
desperate liquidity crisis.229  There were, in other words, all the earmarks of a self-serving bailout 
of Musk’s investment. 
 
224 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
226 2018 WL 1560293 (Del. Ch.) 
227 Id. at 10-11. 
228 Id. at 5. 
229 Id. at 6. 
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 Here was a self-dealing transaction holding out cognizable likelihood of abuse.  As we 
have seen, the contemporary norm against self-dealing transactions carves out an exception for 
acquisitions, where they are tolerated subject to process protections—shareholder votes, proxy 
solicitations, and Revlon scrutiny.  But that is on the sell-side.  The Tesla challenge came on the 
buy-side, where the protective accoutrements tend not to come to bear.  Indeed, in this case, no 
statute required shareholder ratification—transactional approval could have been complete in the 
Tesla boardroom.  A Tesla shareholder vote was provided for nonetheless.  Counsel apparently 
hoped that it would serve to import business judgment scrutiny in respect of a challenge in court.230  
And the merger, which had not been negotiated by an independent Tesla board committee, duly 
received Tesla’s shareholders’ approval.231   
 But the board did not succeed in securing business judgment review.  The question on 
motion to dismiss was whether Musk should be deemed a controlling shareholder, a result leading 
to fairness as the standard of review.  As noted, Musk’s ownership block fell well short of a 
majority.232  Vice Chancellor Slights held Musk to be in control nonetheless, based on a searching 
look at the ties between Tesla and Musk and the approving directors (even directors deemed 
independent under the stock exchange rules), combined with a look at Musk’s dominance over 
Tesla’s business plan.233    
 In Delaware law today, influence makes for control in the right case, and the zone of 
influence as control has been expanding.  A long-standing line recently was crossed when the 
Chancery Court held that possession of a contractual right to block a transaction implied control.234  
We see once again that policing remains vigorous, even though “as of right” fairness scrutiny has 
receded into history. 
 
230 See Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (holding that director approval of a 
transaction not subject to entire fairness review is entitled to pleading stage business judgment deference when the 
transaction is later approved by an uncoerced, fully informed majority vote of disinterested stockholders) 
231 2018 WL 1560293, at 7-10. 
232 Because the merger had been ratified by the shareholders, a finding that Musk did not control meant business 
judgment scrutiny. 
233 2018 WL 1560293, at 12-19.   See also Calesa Assocs., L.P. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., 2016 WL 770251, at 11 (Del. 
Ch.); Thermopylae Capital P'rs, L.P. v. Simbol, Inc., 2016 WL 368170, at 14 (Del. Ch.); N.J. Carpenters Pension 
Fund v. infoGROUP, Inc., 2011 WL 4825888, at 11 (Del. Ch.). 
234See Basho Technologies Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Investors, LLC, 2018 WL 3326693, at 24-32 (Del. 
Ch.) 
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D. Commentary 
 Barriers to judicial review of self-dealing transactions have risen steadily since Marsh 
wrote in 1966.  The Delaware judiciary has played a prominent role in this change.  The judges, in 
their ongoing back-and-forth with the bar and the academy, assure us that all is well.  They in 
effect ask for our trust on the ground that every fact pattern is implicitly reviewed for fairness 
under their standards-based jurisprudence.  An abusive transaction remains subject to attack, 
whether on the ground that board members were not independent, that a special committee process 
was infirm, or that a large shareholder effectively controlled the transaction’s outcome.  
Meanwhile, barriers to judicial review serve as useful filters of meritless claims. 
 Only time can tell us whether this experiment in process-based fiduciary minimalism will 
be successful.  Institutional factors matter more here than do particular doctrinal statements of 
rules and standards—the experiment will succeed only if the members of the Delaware bench are 
as good as their advocates say they are.  Importantly, the bench gets the benefit of support from 
corporate counsel, for the move to standards and accompanying disavowal of safe harbors tips the 
scale to favor conservative over facilitative advice-giving.  In an environment of growing 
uncertainty, the only thing that can be relied upon is clear cut independence completely free of 
contaminating noise on the screen. 
This Article adds a point to the case for Delaware: the corporate governance system has 
evolved so as to shift the costs and benefits in the experiment’s favor.   Although the experiment 
holds out risks, particularly in respect of controlled companies, they are risks worth taking.   
 Meanwhile, neither the shareholders themselves nor their institutional intermediaries 
register any concern about a self-dealing problem.  If there were such concern, one would expect 
to see a best practices initiative related thereto, as we have seen with staggered boards, plurality 
voting, and executive pay.  Nothing stops an individual company from opting into a Marsh-type 
regime of prohibition in its charter.  But no such initiatives have come to the fore. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article reconsiders and rejects the evolutionary erosion account without directly 
refuting its case for prohibition.  Recall that the case for prohibition turns on the invocation of the 
arm’s length bargain as a normative standard.  The case then asserts that unless the system pursuant 
to which a self-dealing transaction is approved (whether the approval comes in the boardroom, at 
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a shareholders’ meeting, or in an ex post reviewing court) assures us that the transaction replicates 
the trade a sole owner would have made at arm’s length, the shareholder interest inevitably suffers.  
Nothing in today’s corporate governance system holds out such an assurance, however much the 
system’s operation has improved across the past several decades.  Boardroom approval processes 
now approach the quality of sole owner negotiation but do not replicate it.    
 But the shareholder interest suffers little even as barriers to judicial fairness review rise 
ever higher.  This is because the governance system now plays an active protective role.  It has 
made self-dealing transactions so inconvenient as change their cost-benefit posture within 
boardrooms.  A norm of disfavor also operates, much alleviating the problem of structural bias.  It 
follows that the classic self-dealing transactions no longer should be seen as inevitable, negative 
incidents of dispersed shareholding.   
 Areas of risk remain, particularly in controlled (or heavily influenced) companies, 
particularly in respect of mergers and acquisitions.  Here, no prohibitive norm operates, for it is 
generally thought that the shareholders’ overall interests are advanced if the board remains free to 
take a look at every deal that comes along, even one tainted by self-dealing.  The governance 
system accordingly still relies on frequent reference over to judicial review.  The case for referring 
these matters over to the discretion of the Delaware courts is robust. 
